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USING THE RANDOMIZED RESPONSE TECHNIQUE TO 
INVESTIGATE ILLEGAL FISHING AND CONTRIBUTE TO 
ABALONE MANAGEMENT IN NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 
 
Sara Grace Blank 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Illegal fishing has detrimental environmental and social impacts, but these effects are 
difficult to mitigate without reliable estimates of fisher non-compliance.  Methods 
used by fisheries managers to estimate illegal fishing often require indirect estimation 
of poaching using biological, economic, or sociological indicators.  This study 
presents a unique application of the randomized response technique (RRT) for direct 
estimation of non-compliance in the Northern California recreational red abalone 
(Haliotis rufescens) fishery. Using an anonymous paper-based compliance and socio-
demographic survey of recreational fishers in Sonoma and Mendocino Counties, I 
estimate 29% non-compliance with the daily take limit, 23% with the minimum size 
limit, 19% with licensing laws, and 15% with the annual take limit and among the 
general population.  No significant relationship between the socio-demographic 
variables gathered (age, income, county of residence, fishing experience) and RRT 
survey responses indicates that no clear profile can be ascertained to help identify 
potential violators.  However, visitors have higher non-compliance estimates for all 
regulations except daily take limits, for which an estimated 72% of locals violate vs. 
only 18% of visitors.  These rule-specific violation estimates allow for the 
development of efficient management priorities, as managers may target specific 
measures or user groups.  Further research should develop quantitative RRT estimates 
of illegal take, and explore violation drivers operating within the fisher population. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Illegal and exploitative fishing practices are some of the greatest global threats 
to marine ecosystems (New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries, 2006).  Illegal fishing can 
detrimentally affect affiliated species and habitats, reduce biodiversity, and jeopardize 
the success of marine reserves (Pitcher et al., 2002; Turpie et al. 2003; Mak et al., 
2005; Fassen and Watts, 2007).  Furthermore, social impacts may also result from 
illegal take which can create tension in communities, threaten the livelihoods of law-
abiding fishers, and encourage crime (Tarr, 2000; Pitcher et al., 2002; Turpie et al., 
2003; Fassen and Watts, 2007)   To counter this threat, different conservation 
strategies have been implemented worldwide ranging from resource management 
techniques based on traditional knowledge and customs to government-led Quota 
Management Systems (McCay, 1980; da Silva, 2004).  These conservation 
mechanisms have various costs and benefits for marine biodiversity and must be 
tailored specifically to each situation (Stefansson and Rosenberg, 2005).  Fisheries 
that manage only a single target species may overlook the impact of take on affiliated 
species, while multi-species management is more complex and may require greater 
enforcement and monitoring to ensure compliance (Hollowed et al., 2000).   
Managers must weigh their conservation priorities to determine which management 
tools are the most appropriate to the fishery. 
One example of a fishery that continues to combat illegal fishing, despite 
years of evolving management measures, is the North American red abalone (Haliotis 
rufescens) fishery.  Red abalone once extended from Mexico to Oregon, but due to 
over-harvest and poor monitoring in the past, their range has been greatly reduced 
(CDFG, 2005, 3-1).  At present, the only red abalone fishery in California is the 
recreational fishery north of San Francisco, but non-compliance with management 
measures is adversely affecting the sustainability of the resource (CDFG, 2005).  As 
the Abalone Recovery and Management Plan (ARMP) states, “abalone poaching has 
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been a serious concern in California for decades and continues to have a major impact 
on stocks” (CDFG, 2005, p. 3-9). 
The main hurdle managers encounter when monitoring the recreational red 
abalone fishery is the problem of estimating take, both legal and illegal.  Legal take 
estimates have wide confidence intervals due to low compliance with the requirement 
to return abalone report-cards at the end of each season, and illegal take is only 
roughly estimated based on enforcement data and periodic vehicle roadblocks 
(CDFG, 2005; Rogers-Bennett, Sen. Biologist Specialist CDFG, pers. comm., 
December 21, 2007).  Illegal take exacerbates the impact of the 35,000 recreational 
fishers who legally take abalone each season in Northern California, yet there are 
presently no limits to the number of fishers who may join the fishery (CDFG, 2005; 
Kalvass and Geibel, 2006).  Serial depletion has wiped out populations of several 
abalone species around California throughout the last century (CDFG, 2005), and 
there are already signs of depletion at heavily used red abalone sites (CDFG, 2007b).  
As a result of increasing fishing pressure, legal take limits have been reduced several 
times, which when combined with a high global market price for abalone meat, has 
increased the incentive to poach (Karpov et al., 2000; CDFG, 2005).  California 
Department of Fish and Game (2005) states that, “poaching poses a threat to the 
sustainable management of abalone because it cannot be quantified and has an impact 
on both legally-fished and recovering stocks” (p. 3-9). 
The problems faced by red abalone managers in Northern California are 
typical of those faced by marine managers world-wide.  As global pressure on marine 
resources continues to grow, managers have often turned to economic models of 
regulatory enforcement to combat the incentive to violate take limits (Hatcher et al., 
2000).  These measures assume that stricter penalties and tighter enforcement of 
environmental regulations will offset the economic incentives of illegal behavior 
(Sumaila et al., 2006). Research has shown that these measures may work to deter 
some individuals, but there will inevitably be violators if there is money to be made 
from behaving illegally (Sumaila et al., 2006).  Therefore, illegal resource use is 
inseparably linked to marine management, and managers must seek methods for 
estimating illegal activity which will give them the clearest information about its 
extent and characteristics and allow them to set efficient priorities.  Unfortunately, 
there is no information available from the California red abalone fishery which 
managers may use to gauge compliance with these measures.   
 3 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
 
This thesis will present a case study of illegal fishing using the red abalone 
(Haliotis rufescens) in Northern California as the focal species.   It will seek to 
contribute to the effectiveness of the tools available to resource managers for 
estimating non-compliance, by presenting a unique application of the randomized 
response technique to a marine fishery.  Primary data estimating violation rates will 
be presented for several regulatory measures, and these findings will be analyzed 
against fisher socio-demographic variables.  The results will suggest methods and 
policies that may improve the ability of the California Department of Fish and Game 
to assess and influence non-compliance, and could be generally used by resource 
managers for priority setting, conservation, and monitoring. 
1.3 Conceptual Framework 
 
This thesis was designed using Creswell’s (2003) model of research 
conceptualization.  A problem-centered approach to method design was considered 
the most appropriate towards investigating the problem of illegal marine resource use.   
The research was approached from a pragmatic theoretical perspective which allowed 
for the use of mixed methods research tools that could be readily put in to practice.  
Pragmatism, which derives from the theoretical work of Peirce (1965), Mead (1938), 
James (1907), and Dewey (1931) gives researchers freedom to choose tools from 
quantitative and qualitative research in order to gain the best understanding of the 
research problem (Cherryholmes, 1992; Creswell, 2003).  The mixed methods format, 
and the use of sequential procedures, allowed the study to begin with a quantitative 
method where statistical analysis was conducted on survey data to examine levels of 
compliance with current laws related to recreational red abalone fishing, and end with 
the qualitative method of semi-structured interviews to examine expert opinions on 
the implications of non-compliance for the management of the species.  
The research and analysis is grounded in the literature surrounding illegal 
marine resource use and detection, the history of the red abalone fishery of Northern 
California, and the randomized response technique (see Figure 1.1).  While there is 
some literature which addresses both RRT and illegal resource use, this is the first 
study to apply the method to an abalone fishery.  The literature from these three areas 
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is used to ensure that any recommendations which result from the research are in line 
with the physical limitations of the fishery and the abilities of the management 
regime.  In the context of this research it is accepted that managers have widely relied 
on deterrence models of compliance, which are based on economic theories of 
exclusion and property rights (Hardin, 1968; Hatcher et al., 2000; Sumaila et al., 
2006).  Therefore, the analysis and recommendations of this thesis will seek to be 
readily achievable under the most recently adopted regulatory framework: the 
Abalone Recovery and Management Plan (CDFG, 2005).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework Illustration 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
1.4.1 Aim    
 
Estimate rates of non-compliance with fishing regulations for red abalone 
(Haliotis rufescens) in Northern California and discuss possible management 
implications.   
1.4.2 Objectives and Research Questions 
 
Objective 1: Utilize the Randomized Response Technique (RRT) to estimate 
proportions of non-compliance of recreational fishers in the red abalone (Haliotis 
rufescens) fishery of Northern California, and analyze socio-demographic variables 
which may affect those proportions. 
Research Question 1.1: How do local abalone fishers compare to visiting 
fishers in terms of violation proportions? 
Research Question 1.2: Does a certain sector of the recreational fishing 
population engage in illegal red abalone take more than others? 
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Objective 2:  Analyze the level of fisher awareness of abalone law. 
Research Question 2.1: What is the level of awareness of red abalone 
regulations amongst abalone fishers? 
Research Question 2.2: How does awareness of abalone regulations affect the 
likelihood of violation? 
 
Objective 3: Address the policy and management implications of data on rates of 
non-compliance for abalone management in Northern California. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is organized as illustrated in Figure 1.2.   The aims and objectives 
from this chapter inform the selection of material that is included in the literature 
review.  As the conceptual framework describes, literature from three focus areas is 
explored to give context to the findings of this study.  These areas are illegal resource 
use and management, the methodological literature on the randomized response 
technique, and the literature pertaining to red abalone (Haliotis rufescens) in Northern 
California.  The methods used in this study are tailored to the aims and objectives, 
bearing in mind the methodologies used in previous fishery studies.  Two methods are 
used: a paper-based survey of recreational abalone fishers, and semi-structured 
interviews with abalone experts.  The findings of these two methods are presented in 
Chapter 4: Results and Analysis.  Finally, Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusions, 
presents the findings in the light of the objectives, providing interpretation and insight 
from the literature review.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Thesis Structure
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
Survey Semi-Structured Interview 
Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusions 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
Previous research relevant to this study has focused on illegal resource and 
fishing issues, management, and compliance.  This chapter will begin by introducing 
the issue of illegal abalone fishing in Northern California, discussing the problems 
associated with creating estimates of illegal take, and presenting the benefits of such 
an estimate for this and other fisheries. The life history of red abalone (Haliotis 
rufescens) and a brief history of the California abalone fishery will be discussed, 
illustrating the vulnerability of abalone to fishing pressure.  The impacts of illegal 
fishing on abalone fisheries will be discussed, and a discussion of the biological and 
social impacts of illegal take in general will illustrate the importance of assessing and 
controlling non-compliance.  A brief description of the methods which have been 
used by managers to estimate non-compliance, and the limitations of those methods, 
will illustrate the complexity of the issues which managers must consider. Finally, 
there will be a discussion of compliance theory, the drivers that affect the decision to 
violate, and how these are affected by management.  The chapter will conclude with a 
description of the measures currently used to regulate red abalone in Northern 
California, and management information gaps.   
 
2.2 Illegal Abalone Fishing in Northern California 
 
According to the Abalone Recovery and Management Plan (ARMP) of the 
California Department of Fish and Game (2005), illegal fishing “has been a serious 
concern for decades and continues to have a major impact on abalone stocks” (p. 3-9).  
The ARMP describes illegal take as being perpetrated by two groups of violators 
(CDFG, 2005).  The first type are commercial poachers, who take abalone to sell as 
part of illegal commercialization rings (CDFG, 2005).  The second group are 
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recreational fishers who violate abalone regulations unknowingly, for personal 
consumption, or to give the animals to other individuals without engaging with the 
market (CDFG, 2005).  Enforcement personnel in northern California continue to 
report encounters with both types of violators, indicating non-compliance with 
abalone regulations is prevalent (CDFG, 2005).  As a result, enforcement effort has 
been increased in Northern California, and the Department of Fish and Game, 
“expends considerable funding and effort towards enforcement of fishing regulations, 
including abalone fishing” (CDFG, 2005, p. 3-10).  Unfortunately, the success or 
failure of enforcement effort is difficult to determine, because attempts to estimate the 
level of illegal abalone fishing have been limited.   
 
2.2.1 Non-Compliance Estimates 
 
Efforts to examine illegal take levels are generally restricted by the difficulty 
in contacting violators.  Poachers who collect large quantities of abalone for illegal 
commercialization make up an extremely small proportion of the fisher population 
and are highly evasive (CDFG, 2005).  Enforcement officers generally cannot observe 
the illegal activities of commercial poachers in the field because they can not predict 
“how, when and where they conduct their illegal activities” (CDFG, 2005, p. 3-10). 
As a result of the difficulty in contacting this group “a reliable estimate of the amount 
of [commercial] poaching is not available, though crude estimates have been made 
from warden intercept data” (CDFG, 2005, p. F-12).    
Encounters with recreational fishers who have violated for non-commercial 
purposed are far more common than encounters with commercially-motivated 
poachers (CDFG, 2005). Recreational fishers who fall under the second category of 
violators are easily contacted, and frequently cited by wardens in the field and at 
periodic vehicle checkpoints (Riske, 2003; Riske 2006).  Data collected from the 
roadblocks are used to calculate the percentage of violations on an annual basis, but as 
the ARMP explains, “these contacts are not truly random (checkpoints, for example 
are announced in the media ahead of time), thus they cannot be used to accurately 
estimate illegal take” (CDFG, 2005, p 3-10).  Therefore, though recreational fishers 
can be readily accessed, no method has yet been developed to accurately estimate the 
proportion of non-compliance in this fishery. 
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The development of a non-compliance estimate would enrich management’s 
understanding of the characteristics of recreational fishing in Northern California 
(Rogers-Bennett, Biologist Specialist, pers. comm., 2007).  It would allow managers 
to consider the possible impacts illegal take may have on the sustainability of red 
abalone populations, and give them more information to draw from when setting 
priorities and reviewing regulatory measures (Sumaila et al., 2006).  Additionally, 
data about what regulations are most subject to non-compliance could help the 
managers in Northern California to better understand their fisher population, and 
which management tools could help reduce illegal behavior (Furlong, 1991; 
Hønneland, 1999).  
Furthermore, the problems faced by managers in the red abalone fishery are 
typical of those faced worldwide.  In order to maintain take at sustainable levels, all 
resource managers must attempt to assess the status of stocks by looking at catch and 
effort statistics, but “the underreporting of illegal catches results in the absence of a 
significant part of the annual catch that is not included in the assessment and [this] 
results in distorted estimates of sustainable catches” (Sumaila et al., 2006, p. 296).  As 
a result, managers who cannot accurately estimate non-compliance must operate with 
insufficient information, and stock estimates for their fisheries are plagued with high 
levels of uncertainty (Stefansson and Rosenberg, 2005).  In the case of abalone, which 
inhabit largely similar habitats around the world, and exhibit many of the same 
biological vulnerabilities to over-harvest, methods used in one location may be 
effective internationally. 
 
2.3 Introduction to the Red Abalone (Haliotis rufescens) 
 
Abalone are a genus (Haliotis) which inhabit rocky shores in waters all over 
the globe (Hahn, 1989; Geiger, 2000) (See Figure 2.1).  Worldwide, there are over 
100 species of abalone (Russell, 2004).  These species serve an important role in 
maintaining community structure within their habitats through herbivory and by 
providing an important food source for fish, cephalopods, asteroids, and crustaceans 
(Scheibling, 1994; Russell, 2004).  
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Figure 2.1 Global Distribution of Haliotid Species (From: Russell, 2004) 
 
 
Abalone meat is widely consumed by humans, and is considered a delicacy in 
many cultures, particularly in Asia (Lichfield, 2005; Green, 2007).  The biggest 
commercial catches and export figures for abalone come from South Africa, New 
Zealand, and the Mediterranean (Tarr, 2000; Huchette and Clavier, 2004; Russell, 
2004).  However, nations around the world are restricting legal commercial catch with 
quotas, in order to decrease fishing pressure on abalone species and avoid population 
collapse (Sanders and Beinssen, 1998; Tarr, 2000; Huchette and Clavier, 2004; 
Lichfield, 2005; Green, 2007).  Unfortunately, as a result of reduced supply, the 
global price of abalone meat and shell products has increased ten-fold in the last two 
decades, and abalone meat now sells at a higher wholesale price than lobster 
(Lichfield, 2005; Green, 2007).  Illegal fishing is rampant, exacerbated by restrictive 
quota systems, high demand, and black market incentives (Tarr, 2000).  As a result, 
the conservation status of abalone species is mixed, and decades after the closure of 
several commercial fisheries, many species still suffer from serial depletion (Tarr, 
2000; Huchette and Clavier, 2004; CDFG, 2005).  Abalone have sensitive life cycles, 
and require heavy monitoring by managers to avoid population collapses such as 
those which have occurred in many historical commercial abalone fisheries (Tegner et 
al., 1992; CDFG, 2005; Lichfield, 2005). 
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2.3.1 Biological Characteristics of H. rufescens  
 
The red abalone (Haliotis rufescens) is one of eight species of abalone found 
in Californian waters, and can grow to a maximum of 313 mm (see Figure 2.2) 
(CDFG, 2005; Leaf et al., 2007; CDFG, 2007a).  The Abalone Recovery and 
Management Plan states, “the regular appearance of red abalone in the commercial 
landings, as compared to some of the other species, may be a reflection of differences 
in distribution and vulnerability to take” (CDFG, 2005, p. 3-3).  However, even 
though H. rufescens is the largest marine gastropod in California and has the broadest 
depth range of commercially fished abalone (0-30 meters), their physiology and 
reproductive strategy make them quite vulnerable to predation and fishing (CDFG, 
2005).  These biological vulnerabilities limit the ability of many abalone species to 
withstand the impacts of poaching, or a commercial or recreational fishery (Brown, 
1986; Ward, 1986; Clavier, 1992; Tarr, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Haliotis rufescens (From: Haaker et al., 1986)  
 
The first biological trait of red abalone that makes them vulnerable to fishing 
is their slow rate of growth.  Red abalone can live in excess of 30 years, and are 
characterized by slow growth throughout their life cycle (CDFG, 2007b, p. 1).  They 
feed by grazing on fragments of kelp that are delivered by currents or surge, and are 
mainly associated with the giant kelp, Macrocystis pyrifera (Cox. 1962; Vilchis et al., 
2005).  Vilchis et al. (2005) found the growth of red abalone is limited by water 
temperature, because warm water reduces kelp densities and increases the prevalence 
of Withering Syndrome (“Canidatus Xenohaliotids californiensis”), a fatal abalone 
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disease (Friedman et al, 2000; Bower, 2003).  Abalone growth is also affected by 
other external natural events such as the “frequency and intensity of El Niño Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) phenomena,” and anthropogenic effects such as pollution (Vilchis 
et al., 2005, p. 469).  As a result of the inherently slow growth rates of red abalone, 
and their sensitivity to environmental conditions, it can take 6-8 years for an 
individual to reach sexual maturity (Vilchis et al., 2005).   
High mortality rates among young abalone reduce the number of recruits that 
survive to adulthood, making the population vulnerable to further sources of mortality 
(CDFG, 2007b, p. 1).  Small abalone live in crevice habitats and are preyed upon by 
benthic invertebrates such as octopus, sea stars, and crabs (Leaf et al., 2007).  
Predation mortality decreases as individuals increase in size, but slow growth rates 
mean red abalone are at a vulnerable size for many years (Leaf et al., 2007).  Adults 
enjoy less predation despite their choice of more exposed habitats, because they are 
more mobile, better at adhering to substrates, and more difficult for predators to 
handle (Leaf et al., 2007).   
As natural predation tapers off, recreational fishing mortality begins to be a 
major source of adult abalone mortality in Northern California, especially in southern 
Sonoma County (Fanshawe et al., 2003; Leaf et al., 2007).  Fishing can result in both 
intentional and incidental abalone mortality.  Abalone are vulnerable to incidental 
fishing mortality because their blood does not clot, so cuts on the foot deeper than ½ 
inch are usually fatal, as are cuts around the head (CDFG, 2007b).  Lacerations 
commonly occur while the animals are being removed from rock, and abalone often 
die even when a rounded pry iron is used (Cox, 1962; CDFG, 2007b).  Improper 
replacement of abalone not retained by fishers is another common cause of incidental 
death (Cox, 1962; CDFG, 2007b).  Abalone need a hard substrate to adhere to in order 
to be mobile, and if they are knocked or dropped onto a soft surface (such as sand) 
they will be unable to clamp down or right themselves, resulting in death or predation 
(Cox, 1962; CDFG, 2007b).   
Fishing mortality can also adversely impact abalone recruitment, because 
abalone employ a reproductive strategy that is density-dependent (Vilchis et al., 
2005).  Abalone are characterized by low reproductive success because they release 
eggs and sperm into the water during synchronized spawning events, and if mating 
individuals are more than one to two meters apart, fertilization is highly unsuccessful 
(Tegner et al., 1996; CDFG, 2005).  Abalone residing in shallow aggregations 
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generally have higher fertilization success than more dispersed deep water 
populations, but these shallow aggregates are more vulnerable to fishing mortality 
(Tarr, 2000).  A management plan which incorporates recreational fishing must 
maintain adequate adult densities to ensure larval production (Vilchis et al., 2005).    
If fishing pushes the abalone population under a certain minimum density threshold, 
the remaining abalone will not be able to produce enough recruits to replace the 
individuals being removed and account for natural mortality rates, resulting in serial 
depletion (CDFG, 2005).  Red abalone managers must therefore perform frequent 
biological surveys of abalone population densities at multiple locations in order to 
prevent the rapid declines seen in the other California species (Tarr, 2000; CDFG, 
2005). 
Furthermore, managers must also consider the size of abalone being removed 
from the fishery to ensure adequate recruitment, because the reproductive capacity of 
an individual red abalone is linked to their size.  As Rogers-Bennett et al. (2004, p. 
553) explain, “management strategies such as minimum legal sizes depend on 
reproduction occurring prior to the onset of fishing”, but the reproductive physiology 
of red abalone makes setting an appropriate minimum size limit difficult, because size 
is related to fertility.  Egg production in females increases exponentially with size 
from 50mm to 215 mm (Rogers-Bennett et al., 2004).  This trait poses another 
challenge to managers, because in the short term, the removal of large adults will have 
a greater negative effect on recruitment than if fishers targeted the sub-adult 
population.  However, there will be fewer large adults in the future if sub-adults are 
targeted by fishers now. 
 
2.3.2 History of the California Abalone Fishery 
 
Due to their sensitive physiology abalone populations can take decades to 
recover from a fishery-induced collapse, as has been seen with the black and pink 
abalone of California (CDFG, 2005).  Long before colonization by Europeans, 
abalones were an important source of food and trade for the native people of 
California (Cox, 1962).  During this time the abalones’ natural predator, the sea otter, 
ranged the entire length of the California coastline keeping abalone populations down.  
However, European colonization, and the subsequent boom in fur trading meant that 
by the mid-1800’s there were virtually no sea otters remaining along the California 
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coast (Cox, 1962).  The removal of the abalones’ main predator resulted in a 
population boom of all the Californian abalone species throughout the fur trade era, 
allowing a commercial fishery to develop (CDFG, 2005). 
The commercial abalone fishery of California was unstable from very early 
on, with landings of both green abalone (Haliotis fulgens) and black abalone (Haliotis 
cracherodii) peaking in 1879 and collapsing by 1913 (Edwards, 1913; Cox, 1962).  
Fishing data from mandatory landing receipts from 1950 to 1996 showed that the 
1940’s were generally characterized by increased commercial landings (CDFG, 
2005).  However, “the patterns observed in combined landings mask[ed] patterns of 
the individual species landings…[so that] apparent stability from 1952 to 1968 was in 
fact an illusion composed of multiple species landings in multiple fishing areas” 
(CDFG, 2005, p. 3-3).   
The misinformation provided by combined landing reports masked the serial 
decline of each of California’s abalone species (CDFG, 2005).  There were also 
occasional sharp increases and decreases in landings, but these coincided with 
increased or decreased legal size limits, and did not reflect the status of the abalone 
species (CDFG, 2005).  In the last years of the commercial abalone fishery, from 
1987-1997, most abalone species were at very low population levels (CDFG, 2005).  
Fishers had joint sea urchin/abalone harvest permits, which allowed them to bolster 
business by mainly landing urchins, while still taking abalone when they would find 
them (Dugan & Davis, 1993; CDFG, 2005).  The commercial abalone fishery in 
California was finally closed in 1997 (CDFG; 2005). 
 
2.4 Illegal Fishing 
 
Throughout the many phases of abalone management in California there have 
always been fishers engaging in illegal harvest.  In one of the only articles to directly 
address the severity of non-compliance in Northern California’s abalone fishery, 
Daniels and Floren (1998) use anecdotal accounts from enforcement officers, 
newspaper reports, and court documents to illustrate the level of illegal take just prior 
to, and just after the commercial fishing ban took effect.  These sources document the 
pervasive illegal activity in Northern California.  Daniels and Floren (1998) claim 
“the one-day, tax-free earning potential of an unrestrained poacher easily exceeds 
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$3,000…[and in Northern California it] is common enough to be seen by any 
interested observer” (p. 859).  The most obvious displays of illegal fishing behavior 
are those of recreational sport fishers who violate size and quantity limits, but more 
elusive networks of poachers are also periodically busted by enforcement (Daniels 
and Floren, 1998; CDFG, 2005).  A decade after commercial fishing was outlawed in 
all Californian waters, these poaching rings continue to have black market trade links 
to local restaurants and seafood markets that will buy abalone meat from fishers with 
sport licenses rather than paying more for legally farmed abalone meat (Daniels and 
Floren, 1998; Rogers-Bennett and Melvin, 2007). 
Unfortunately, illegal take of red abalone has not been sufficiently 
documented in the literature beyond anecdotal accounts from the media and best-
guess estimates from enforcement (CDFG, 2005).  As is the case in many nations 
around the world, there are currently no reliable statistics for this fishery which allow 
for the accurate estimation of illegal take (CDFG, 2005; Lichfield, 2005).  Instead, the 
most comprehensive quantitative study of illegal abalone take comes from Rob Tarr’s 
(2000) research into poaching in South Africa.   
South Africa suffers from extraordinarily high levels of illegal take, and Tarr 
(2000) used economic modeling methods to estimate that up to twice as much abalone 
was exported to Asia from South Africa as was allowed under the commercial quota.  
This level of take is clearly unsustainable, and as a result marine biologists have 
predicted abalone in South Africa will soon be all but extinct (Tarr, 2000; Lichfield, 
2005).  Tarr’s (2000), accounts of armed confrontations between poachers and 
enforcement officers, and the extreme fishing effort in South Africa, reflect both the 
high monetary benefits of abalone poaching, and the significant biological and social 
impacts that often result from illegal fishing (Pauly et al., 2002).  In order to better 
understand the seriousness of these impacts in Northern California, it is useful to 
examine the broader literature on the ramifications of illegal fishing in general.   
 
2.4.1 General Illegal Fishing Impacts 
 
Illegal fishing is widely viewed as a major threat to the sustainable 
management of marine resources in general, because research has shown that illegal 
fishing can have impacts on both the biological sustainability of ecosystems and 
species, and on the social networks that rely on these resources (Tarr, 2000; Pauly et 
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al., 2002).  While this discussion will not provide a comprehensive list of effects, it 
discusses some illegal fishing impacts that are illustrative of the general trends of this 
activity.  These impacts are summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below. 
 
Table 2.1:  Biological Impacts of Illegal Fishing 
Biological Impacts Example Case Studies 
Transformation of natural 
vegetation 
- Turpie et al., 2003 -  multiple marine species, South 
Africa 
- Estes and Duggins, 1995 – sea otters and giant kelp, 
Alaska, U.S. 
Population reductions of target and 
affiliated marine species 
- Turpie et al., 2003 - multiple marine species, South 
Africa 
- Faasen and Watts, 2007 - multiple marine species, 
South Africa 
- Tarr, 2000 - abalone (Haliotis midae), South Africa 
Impacts on related species, 
ecosystem changes, and pollution. 
- Pitcher et al., 2002 - multiple case studies 
- Edirisinghe, 2003 -  reef fish,  Sri Lanka 
- Mak et al., 2005 – reef fish, Philippines 
- Sterckx et al., 2006 - coral reefs, Indonesia 
Reduced marine reserve success 
and threats to species sustainability 
- Faasen and Watts, 2007 - multiple marine species, 
South Africa 
- Fanshawe et al., 2003 – abalone and sea otters, 
California, U.S. 
Reduction in option value of 
biodiversity 
- Turpie et al., 2003 – multiple marine species, South 
Africa 
- Edirisinghe, 2003 – reef fish,  Sri Lanka 
 
 
Illegal fishing has had enormous biological impacts on the marine 
environment on both localized and global scales.  On a local level, illegal take has 
been blamed for undermining the success of marine reserves and sanctuaries, thereby 
putting further pressure on recovering populations (Tarr, 2000; Faasen and Watts, 
2007).  Studies have found that fishing can have impacts similar to predation on 
recovering species, effectively doubling mortality rates and impeding their recovery 
(Fanshawe et al., 2003).  Other localized events, such as habitat transformation, can 
also result from the illegal exploitation of resources (Estes and Duggins, 1995).  
Turpie et al. (2003) found that illegal resource use had transformed the natural 
vegetation along a coastal area in South Africa.  In addition, Tarr (1996) reported that 
as abalone poaching increased, an ecological change occurred whereby large numbers 
of rock lobsters moved into the kelp forest and consumed the entire population of sea 
urchins.  The loss of the sea urchins had further negative consequences for juvenile 
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abalone (H. midae), that use urchin spines for shelter in areas with few protective 
crevice habitats (Tarr, 1996). 
Illegal fishing can also result in biological impacts on a global level.  Pitcher 
et al. (2002) used case studies of Iceland and Morocco to describe instances where 
large volumes of non-target species were being illegally discarded as bycatch, despite 
laws prohibiting this practice.  “High-grading”, as it is known, is meant to increase the 
amount of high-value fish vessels can land, while still appearing to remain within the 
limits of the legal catch quotas.  The practice of discarding fish that are not of the 
target species as bycatch is banned in many fisheries, and has been widely 
documented to upset the food web and result in impacts on other species (Pauly et al., 
2002; Pitcher et al., 2002).  Similar impacts are also seen with other illegal fishing 
methods, such as using cyanide or dynamite, which also result in damage to 
ecosystems, high mortality of non-target species, and pollution (Edirisinghe, 2003; 
Mak et al., 2005; Sterckx et al., 2006).  
 
Table 2.2:  Social Impacts of Illegal Fishing 
Social Impacts  Example Case Study  
A declining natural environment 
threatens regional economies based on 
eco-tourism. 
- Turpie et al., 2003 - multiple marine species, South 
Africa 
Massive poaching can lead to a 
reduction in the legal commercial quota, 
reducing the income of legal abalone 
fishers. 
- Turpie et al., 2003 - multiple coastal marine 
species, South Africa 
- Tarr; 2000 – abalone (Haliotis midae), South 
Africa 
Poaching creates conflict between 
managers and local people 
- Faasen and Watts, 2007 - multiple marine species, 
South Africa 
- Tarr, 2000 - abalone (Haliotis midae), South Africa 
- Hauck and Sweijd, 1999 – abalone (Haliotis 
midae), South Africa 
Illegal fishing is not monitored, and can 
result in poor food quality. 
- Pitcher et al., 2002 - multiple case studies 
Black market economies develop, 
creating further enforcement issues and 
higher crime rates. 
- Pitcher et al., 2002 - multiple case studies 
- Hauck and Sweijd, 1999 – abalone (Haliotis 
midae), South Africa 
 
Though the biological impacts are significant, it is important to note that 
illegal fishing also has significant social impacts (See Table 2.2 above).  The 
communities that depend on marine resources are invariably affected when illegal 
fishing degrades them (Turpie et al., 2003).  In a case study from South Africa Faasen 
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and Watts (2007) found that social unrest and resentment toward conservation 
officials has become a major problem.  The local people have recently been excluded 
from using marine resources because of the establishment of a marine reserve at 
Tsitsikamma National Park.  However, because the local community suffers from 
racial discrimination and language barriers to employment, they rely on illegal fishing 
to supplement their diet.  This is just one of many examples of illegal fishing causing 
social conflict between fishers, reserve managers, and compliant citizens (Tarr, 2000). 
Beyond simply creating social tension, illegal fishing can also have severe 
economic repercussions which can jeopardize the livelihoods of law-abiding citizens.  
Turpie et al. (2003) describe the severity of illegal take of abalone in South Africa, 
where over two times more abalone is illegally exported than the national quota.  This 
level of illegal take overpowered local management, and forced managers to reduce 
the legal commercial take limit by over twenty-five percent (Tarr, 2000; Turpie et al., 
2003)  Reductions in the total legal take has had a negative impact on the livelihoods 
of law abiding fishers, which may induce more fishers to begin violating (Sumaila, et 
al, 2006).  In addition to this problem, illegal resource use can also jeopardize 
economies that rely on eco-tourism, as reduced environmental quality causes tourists 
to go elsewhere (Turpie et al., 2003).   
Finally, since illegal fishing inevitably results in the development of a black 
market, there are concerns that purchases from this unregulated market may result in 
poor food quality and safety (Pitcher et al., 2002).  As black markets develop, they 
create more management issues, putting further pressure on enforcement budgets and 
increasing crime rates (Hauck and Sweijd, 1999; Pitcher et al., 2002).   
 
2.4.2 Means of Assessing Illegal Activities 
 
Due to the severity and diversity of illegal fishing impacts, managers 
worldwide have struggled for years to estimate illegal take, but it has proven to be 
extremely difficult (Leader-Williams et al., 1990).  In order to improve the quality of 
stock estimates and set appropriate priorities, managers need accurate information 
about the total catch, which includes both legal and illegal take (Tarr, 2000).  While 
managers have developed a wide range of techniques to quantify illegal fishing, none 
of these methods are universally applicable. Table 2.3 lists several of the techniques 
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described in the literature which have been used to detect and estimate illegal fishing, 
as well as their limitations.  
Managers of both terrestrial and aquatic resources have often used direct 
monitoring of stock numbers via techniques such as transects and aerial surveys to 
assess the health of animal populations and watch for signs of poaching impacts 
(Burton, 1999; CDFG, 2005).  However, these methods are limited not only by the 
migratory nature of many marine stocks, but also by the variability of marine habitats 
and conditions, and the costs of data collection (Spencer and Collie, 1997).  In the 
case of California’s red abalone (Haliotis rufescens) the health of the population, and 
the Total Allowable Catch for the whole recreational fishery, is estimated from 
transect surveys conducted at only eight sites (Kashiwada and Taniguchi, 2007).  
Management and enforcement assume that “the impact of poaching, like all forms of 
mortality, would be evident in declining population densities during dive surveys” 
(CDFG, 2005, p. F-12).  However, while stock surveys have the benefit of being able 
to measure the impact of illegal activity directly, time lags in conducting and 
analyzing survey data, and the fact that counts are only conducted at a few sites, make 
it likely that only extreme levels of abalone poaching, as seen in South Africa, would 
be noticeable this way (Tarr, 2000, CDFG, 2005). 
Enforcement-based estimation methods, such as counting the frequency of 
encounters with poachers, making citation-based violation estimates, looking for signs 
of illegal activity, or conducting on-board observer programs, have also been used in 
fisheries with mixed results (Leader-Williams et al., 1990; Smith and Smeltzer, 1991; 
Solomon et al., 2007).  Citation based estimates are highly imprecise and widely 
acknowledged to underestimate illegal take (CDFG, 2005).  These techniques rely on 
the frequency of enforcement contact with violators.  Thus, higher violation estimates 
generally result from more intense enforcement, giving the initial impression that 
greater enforcement effort increases illegal take (Jachmann, 1998; Burton, 1999).  In 
addition, surveillance efforts are regularly used, but can be extremely expensive, 
relying on high levels of human resources and equipment to catch evasive poachers 
(Daniels and Floren, 1998; Tarr, 2000; Solomon et al., 2007).  ICCAT (2000) 
successfully used surveillance and tracking devices to estimate and monitor the illegal 
take of Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) and bluefin tuna (Thunnus 
maccoyii) with support from the Australian government and fishing industry.  
However, many fisheries management agencies around the world are insufficiently 
 19 
Table 2.3:  Illegal Fishing Detection and Quantification Methods 
Method 
Type 
Examples Advantages Limitations  
 
Case Studies 
 
Di
re
ct 
St
oc
k 
As
ses
sm
en
ts 
Transects 
 
Aerial Surveys 
- Measure impact of 
illegal activity directly 
-Reduced accuracy  
with moving stocks 
 
-High level of error in 
projecting population 
densities from one site 
onto many 
 
-Not sensitive enough 
to detect small stock 
reductions 
(Kashiwada and 
Taniguchi, 2007) 
 
(CDFG, 2005) 
En
for
ce
me
nt
-b
as
ed
 E
sti
ma
tio
n 
M
eth
od
s 
Frequency of 
encounters with 
poachers 
 
On-board observers 
 
Citation-based 
violation estimates 
 
Counting signs of 
illegal activity 
 
Net confiscations 
- Data collected 
during regular 
enforcement duties, 
no need to hire 
researchers 
 
- Can give idea of 
changes in illegal take 
 
- Enforcement both 
discourages and 
records illegal action 
- Rely on regularly 
contacting/catching 
poachers 
 
-Projections are 
imprecise 
 
- Expensive (high cost 
for staff and 
equipment) 
 
- Safety Concerns for 
Staff 
(ICCAT, 2000) 
 
(Jachmann, 2008) 
 
So
cia
l S
cie
nc
e M
eth
od
s 
Informants 
 
Interviews 
 
Decision tree 
analysis 
 
Focus groups 
- Can give insights 
into the extent and 
cause of illegal take 
 
- May provide “inside 
information” 
-Must gain confidence 
of informants and 
interviewees 
 
-High levels of 
response bias 
 
-May still be excluded 
from some dealings 
 
-No as appropriate for 
international studies 
(Mann, 1995) 
(Bodigue, 2002) 
Lo
gb
oo
ks
 
 - Provides information about fisher activities 
-Regularly falsified so 
as not to report illegal 
activities 
 
-May not note 
discarded catch 
(Raymakers and 
Lynham, 1999) 
(Harris, 1998) 
 
Ec
on
om
ic 
M
od
eli
ng
 an
d 
M
ar
ke
t S
tu
die
s 
 
Input/Output 
Studies of Fish 
Product Production 
 
Comparisons 
Between Legal 
Export Levels and 
Recorded Imports 
of Other Nations 
- Can illustrate illegal 
take and markets 
 
- Uses information 
collected by 
businesses and other 
nations 
-Require extensive 
knowledge of market 
streams 
 
-Locally specific 
 
-Require projections 
 
-Difficult to apply to 
recreational fisheries 
 
-Do not function well 
with black market 
goods 
(Patterson et al. 1990) 
(Pitcher and Stokes, 
1990) 
(Lewis and Tweddle, 
1990) 
(ISOFISH, 1999) 
(Tarr, 2000) 
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staffed and under-funded, and thus could not afford to pay for the technology or man-
hours necessary to undertake enforcement at this level (Tarr, 2000). 
Social science methods such as interviews, informants, decision tree analysis, 
and focus groups have also been used to estimate illegal take (Damania et al., 2003; 
Solomon et al., 2007).   However, interview and informant-based methods of 
estimating illegal activity generally suffer from bias due to the perception of risk 
among informants who are asked to confess or report illegal behavior (Fox and Tracy, 
1986; Pitcher et al., 2002).  Biases against authorities or “outsiders” may exist, 
making these methods inappropriate for estimating illegal behavior on a large scale, 
because managers may have to invest considerable time and effort to gain the 
confidence of their respondents (Mann, 1995).  
 Logbook reviews can be useful if they are accurate, but logbooks are 
frequently falsified by vessel captains.  Harris (1998) discussed a case in Spain where 
a trawler contained a secret hold with unreported illegal and undersized catch.  The 
captain had been keeping “two sets of logbooks, each with different catch figures” 
and a significant amount of the catch was recorded in the logbook of a different vessel 
(Pitcher et al., 2002, p. 321).  In addition, though catch discarded at sea should be 
logged in the logbooks, vessels engaging in illegal catch or those who are high-
grading by dumping low value fish in favor of others are unlikely to report it. 
Finally, economic modeling methods have been used to estimate illegal take 
with market studies. Patterson et al. (1990) compared reported landings with fishmeal 
production to illustrate that twice the legal limit of fish would be needed to produce 
the current volume of fish meal.  Lewis and Tweddle (1990) did a similar study 
estimating illegal take by looking at fish sacks and fish sales.  Market studies were 
used by Tarr (2000) to estimate that up to two times more abalone was exported to 
Asia than the legal take quotas of South Africa.  Unfortunately, as these authors 
recognize, economic modeling methods do not have a high degree of accuracy, 
because they require extensive information about market streams, which may not be 
available when dealing with illegal markets (Patterson et al, 1990; Tarr, 2000).  
Additionally, several of these market-based methods can only be used to estimate 
illegal take levels for specific areas, and would not be applicable to the complexity of 
global markets (Lewis and Tweeddle, 1990).  Economic methods are also difficult to 
conduct when the target fishery is recreational, because often there is far less 
information available about the activities of black markets (Hauck and Sweijd, 1999; 
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Pitcher et al., 2002).  Furthermore, many fishers may not interact with the market at 
all, and instead retain their illegal catch for personal use (CDFG, 2005). 
As Solomon et al. (2007, p. 4) explain, “the effectiveness of these techniques 
for quantifying illegal resource use is limited by methodological constraints.  Often 
the techniques do not account for the number of people violating the law and therefore 
[they] have limited policy implications”.  This claim is supported by other authors 
who explain that in order to have the greatest impact on illegal fishing, management 
must consider not only the scale of non-compliance, but also which sectors of the 
population are violating most (Hønneland, 1999; Sumaila et al., 2006).   With that 
information, managers can efficiently prioritize problem areas to target with 
enforcement resources, and design policies that effectively engage with compliance 
theory and literature. Therefore, the contribution of this research will be to use the 
randomized response technique to assess marine fisheries compliance and investigate 
the sectors violating.  
 
2.5 Compliance Theory 
 
Managers have developed several models for managing marine resources 
based on different theoretical assumptions about which factors are the most influential 
in determining compliance.  Here I briefly review deterrence models and non-
monetary compliance incentives.  
 
2.5.1 Economic Management Theories 
 
In order to establish the necessary social arrangements which would encourage 
users to limit their take, governments have primarily focused on economic 
management models which give managers “property rights” to marine resources via 
national Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ’s) (Hønneland, 1999).  Managers may 
establish take limits for marine species by setting a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) or 
creating individual quotas or permits entitling each fisher to a given portion of the 
resource.  The California Department of Fish and Game defines Total Allowable 
Catch as “the catch level, in number or weight of [animals], that is allowed each year 
under sport or commercial fishery regulations” (CDFG, 2005, p. References - 17).  As 
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managers are the “owners” of the resources they manage, they are also able to 
establish economic deterrents for violations of the take regulations by enforcing 
economic sanctions and other penalties.   
Economic compliance models make two key assumptions.  The first is that 
fishers have access to information about the costs and benefits of behaving illegally.  
If fishers have inadequate awareness of either of these factors, the choices they make 
and the success of management measures will be affected (Hønneland, 1999).  The 
second assumption of economic compliance models is that if fishers have information 
about possible financial gains or losses, they will make rational choices (Hønneland, 
1999, Kahneman, 2003).  Managers attempt to set fines and penalties so that the 
decision to comply is the most rational choice.  However, even when all the 
information is provided, individuals often do not act rationally (Kahneman, 2003).  
Irrational behavior may be the result of personal beliefs or intuitions, peer pressure, 
failure to properly reason options, or social norms (Kahneman, 2003). 
 
2.5.1.1 Deterrence models 
 
Deterrence models of illegal behavior follow from economics-based 
management theories of rational choice.  As Hatcher et al. (2000) point out, 
“economic models of regulatory compliance in fisheries usually assume an 
instrumental determination of individual behavior in which the decision to comply or 
to violate depends primarily on the expected monetary costs and benefits.  Policy 
implications tend, as a result, to focus only on deterrence [via] increasing the 
monetary costs of violation” (p. 448).  In these models, the deterrent effect provided 
by the level of financial sanctions is thought to be the main determinant of compliance 
(Sumaila et al., 2006).  Authors such as Garrett Hardin believe that coercing resource 
users to comply with the threat of power is the only way to implement management 
(Hardin, 1968; Hønneland, 1999). 
 
2.5.2 Normative Compliance Theories 
 
Recently, there have been many compliance studies which illustrate the 
importance of non-monetary factors for encouraging compliance with marine 
regulations.  These studies describe normative theories from the “co-management 
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literature [that] emphasize legitimacy or discursive measures as more effective [than 
economic models] in securing compliance with management regulations” 
(Hønneland, 1999, p. 700).  Social contract and co-management models encourage 
managers to engage in discourse with resource users prior to undertaking regulation, 
because “compliance to such a system is secured not by the threat of power, but 
through the acceptance by participants of the reasonability – or legitimacy – of the 
system” (Hønneland, 1999, p. 703). Generally, a regulation is considered legitimate if 
it complies with social norms, and is understood to serve an important purpose 
(Hønneland, 1999; Sumaila et al., 2006).  Proponents of these models often cite the 
success of specific indigenous or self-managed fisheries to illustrate the effectiveness 
of non-monetary compliance incentives as management tools (McCay, 1980; 
McGoodwin, 1983; Heckathorn, 1990). 
 
2.5.2.1 Non-Monetary Compliance Incentives 
 
Normative theorists believe that non-monetary factors can have a greater 
influence on compliance behavior than “threats of power” under traditional deterrence 
systems, and that moral and social considerations play a vital role in whether an 
individual decides to comply with fishing regulations (Hønneland, 1999; Sutinen and 
Kuperan, 1999).  Non-monetary factors such as social reciprocity can affect the 
behavior of individuals by leveraging their social standing as a deterrent to non-
compliance (Bowles and Gintis, 2002).  Bowels and Gintis (2002) describe the idea of 
social capital as “trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live by the norms 
of one’s community and to punish those who do not” (p. F419).  Particularly in small 
communities, behavioral norms of the collective community can create pressure to 
conform (Bowels and Gintis, 2002).  The social capital within the community, the 
behavior of other fishers, and the moral code of each individual all affect the decision 
to comply or violate, and normative theorists believe these drivers can be influenced 
by managers (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Sumaila et al., 2006). 
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2.5.3 Drivers of Illegal Behavior 
 
Sumaila et al. (2006) combine concepts from both economic and normative 
models to describe five decision-making drivers for compliance (see Figure 2.2).  The 
first consideration regards the level of benefit the fisher would get from partaking in 
the illegal activity.  This driver reflects both economic and normative concerns 
because the rewards of non-compliance could be social or financial.  Factors such as 
the black market value of the item, the time and availability of catch, the cost of 
fishing, the financial status of the fisher, or any related social benefits of take will 
influence the appeal of illegal action (Sumaila et al., 2006).  Though there are limited 
examples, managers typically cannot influence this driver, because international 
cooperation and monitoring is required to intentionally suppress the global price of an 
open access resource (Leader-Williams et al., 1990; Jachmann, 1998). 
Drivers two through four are readily affected by the level of managerial 
enforcement, and are based upon economic theories of compliance.  The second 
driver regards the probability of detection.  This driver depends upon fisher 
perceptions of the intensity of fishery enforcement and monitoring.  The third driver, 
also related to enforcement, is the level of penalty the fisher faces if caught.  This 
driver reflects economic deterrence models of enforcement that assume higher fines 
will reduce the perceived benefit of illegal action.  The fourth driver, the cost of 
avoiding detection, is another expense fishers must consider.  Managers hope that if 
they can increase the disincentives associated with these three drivers, inform the 
fishing community, and enforce regulations with more frequent patrols or higher 
fines, they will reduce non-compliance.   
Finally, the fifth driver speaks to the influence of normative concerns on fisher 
behavior.  This driver is also not typically targeted by regulatory bodies, because it 
represents a combination of factors that are unique to an individual or community, and 
therefore requires more extensive methods of data collection to be understood 
(Hønneland, 1999).  For instance, the social standing and moral outlook of a fisher 
affects their willingness to risk getting caught participating in illegal fishing (Sumaila 
et al., 2006).  Additionally, research has shown that a persons’ age, household 
income, employment status, and previous violation record may influence their 
attitudes toward risk and crime (Furlong, 1991). 
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Communities also have the ability to influence this driver.  If non-compliance 
is considered the social norm, individuals may not worry about the repercussions of 
violation (Cialdini, 2003).  However, if communities use their social capital to put 
pressure on those who act illegally, and fishers perceive non-compliance may reduce 
their social standing, this driver could be used to promote legal behavior (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2002).  Public service announcements can also be used to play on social norms 
and foster compliance (Bator and Cialdini, 2000).  Furthermore, normative theory 
suggests managers can affect this driver and foster community support for 
management measures by increasing perceptions of regulatory legitimacy 
(Hønneland, 1999).  As the Abalone Recovery and Management Plan states, 
“educating the public to the impacts of poaching could exert ‘peer’ pressure to reduce 
poaching and encourage reporting of poaching activities” (CDFG, 2005, p. Appendix 
F-1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Fishing Compliance Drivers and Example Measures  
(Adapted from: Sumaila et al., 2006) 
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2.6 Abalone Management Measures in Northern California 
 
In the recreational red abalone (Haliotis rufescens) fishery of Northern 
California, managers target compliance drivers two, three, and four with increased 
enforcement effort and visibility, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. The chapter on “Abalone 
Enforcement Activities” in the Abalone Recovery and Management Plan encourages 
wardens to use “the most visible method” and patrol the tidal areas in uniform during 
high-traffic minus tides (CDFG, 2005, p. 8-1).  In addition to game wardens, some 
regional, state, and national park personnel may also monitor abalone fishing activity 
within their area, and report illegal activity to Fish and Game.  The public has also 
become involved in enforcement via the CalTIP (Turn In Poachers) Program, which 
encourages them to report violations via a phone hotline (CDFG, 2005).  These efforts 
are combined with the use of video cameras, aircraft, boat patrols, and undercover 
wardens to increase the deterrent effect of drivers two and four (CDFG, 2005).   
The ARMP also reports “enforcement efforts have been augmented recently 
by the justice system, which has been levying greater fines and penalties” to target the 
third compliance driver (CDFG, 2005, p. 3-10).  Penalties for illegal activity range 
from citations and gear confiscation for minor infractions, to heavy fines with the 
possibility of jail time for large or repeat offenses.  Daniels and Floren (1998) 
reported that “fines for petty sport violations in Sonoma County have been 
standardized at $500 USD for a violation involving one abalone, with $250 USD 
added for each additional abalone” (p. 861).  Furthermore, if individuals are caught 
trying to sell recreationally caught abalone, the punishments for first time offenders 
have been known to include jail time and fines starting at $3,000 USD (Daniels and 
Floren, 1998).  
The level of fines and deterrents imposed on violators reflect efforts by 
management to use drivers 2-4 to counteract the effects of the first driver and avoid 
historical problems with resource over-exploitation.  The ARMP states that “as 
abalone stocks have become depleted, the world price has increased, escalating the 
impetus to poach” (CDFG, 2005, 3-10).  Abalone meat is highly sought after as a 
delicacy and has a high value on the black market (CDFG, 2005).  Local restaurants 
and seafood markets are now the main purchasers of illegally sold red abalone, and 
are known to trade or buy wild-caught red abalone from sport fishers (Rogers-Bennett 
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and Melvin, 2007; Daniels and Floren, 1998, CDFG, 2005).  Furthermore, since 
abalone is a delicacy it has non-market uses, as gifts or for personal consumption, 
which also influence the first driver of compliance. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, managers have at their disposal a range of 
economic and normative measures for affecting the compliance drivers of recreational 
fishers.  Traditionally, government managed fisheries have focused on influencing 
drivers two through four, and a range of deterrence model tools have been developed, 
each with pro’s and con’s for sustainability and management (See Table 2.4).  
Normative variables are not always considered when designing management, and 
instead tools are selected based on the specific pressures and biological characteristics 
of the fishery.  Trade-offs between biological advantages and management limitations 
must be weighed when managers decide which measures to implement.  In the case of 
the red abalone fishery of Northern California, managers have designed a range of 
gear and take restrictions to keep the fishery sustainable (see green boxes in Table 
2.4).   
Gear restrictions have been in effect in this fishery for many years, beginning 
with a ban on the use of SCUBA gear to collect abalone introduced over forty years 
ago (Roger-Bennett et al., 2004).  The ban has protected stocks from the over-
exploitation seen in Southern California that further decimated many declining 
abalone species (Karpov and Tegner, 1992).  Red abalone can survive at depths of 80 
feet (24 meters), and as a result of the ban on SCUBA gear, abalone residing at deeper 
depths are generally safe from recreational fishing mortality (CDFG, 2005). The use 
of a blunt abalone pry-iron of specific dimensions is also required in order to 
minimize injury to the abalone as they are removed from their substrate and prevent 
them from bleeding to death (CDFG, 2005). 
Further measures such as seasonal fishery closures during July and from 
December thru March are intended to protect both the abalone stocks and fishers.  
Northern California is prone to rough weather in winter months making fishing 
particularly dangerous, and winter is also spawning season for red abalone (CDFG, 
2005).  The fishery is also closed in July to reduce the total take over the summer 
months and to break up the period of highest fishing effort.  The calm seas, warm 
days, and frequent minus tides of July provide such favorable conditions for abalone 
fishing that popular sites were being picked clean (CDFG, 2005).  
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Table 2.4: Deterrence-Based Tools for Managing Recreational Fisheries  
(Green boxes indicate measures used in the Northern CA Red Abalone Fishery) 
Rule  Example  Advantages Disadvantages 
Report Cards 
M
on
ito
rin
g V
ia 
Do
cu
me
nta
tio
n  
Logbooks 
- Legal fishing effort statistics can be 
calculated 
 - Gives managers information about time, 
location, and quantity of take 
- Report cards may have low return rates if 
penalties for not returning them are not enforced. 
- Analyzing data is taxing on managerial 
resources 
- Difficult for illiterate fishers and non-English 
speakers 
- Illegal take generally not revealed with self-
reporting methods 
- Can illegally buy several report cards/year 
Fishing 
Licensing 
- Allows a database to be created of 
recreational fishers and contact info 
Fis
he
ry 
En
try
 
Re
str
ict
ion
 
Entry Cap - Limits maximum take when demand on fishery is too large 
- Requires proper infrastructure to enforce  
- Difficult to determine the cap level, and how 
fishers will be selected 
- Do not protect from illegal take 
Min Size 
Limits 
-Allows reproduction to occur before the 
onset of fishing pressure 
- Relatively easy to detect with inspection 
Maximum - Protects large fecund individuals - Relatively easy to detect with inspection 
Siz
e R
est
ric
tio
ns
 
Slot-Limits 
- Protects juveniles from fishing pressure 
until predation effects decline and also 
protects highly fecund large adults from 
fishing pressure to encourage replenishment 
- Relatively easy to detect with inspection 
- Min size not as effective at protecting 
reproduction if large adults have greatest 
fecundity 
- Max size does not protect juveniles who may 
experience high levels of natural mortality as 
well 
- Slot-limits may be resisted by fishers in a 
trophy-fishery 
- All measures require adequate staff to enforce 
over large geographical areas 
Annual 
Limits  
- Reduces total extraction from the resource 
- Reflects TAC 
Daily Limits 
- Helps reduce impact of point-source 
depletion because fishers can not collect their 
annual limit in a day 
- Relatively easy to detect with inspection 
Ta
ke
 R
est
ric
tio
ns
 
Catch and 
Release 
- Fishers enjoy resource without removing 
animals 
-  Annual limit violations are difficult to detect 
(particularly if they coincide with document 
falsification) 
- Difficult to determine optimal annual limit  
- All require adequate staff to enforce over large 
geographical areas 
- Catch and Release is not as appropriate for 
invertebrate fisheries and often results in 
mortality from fishing related injury 
Fis
hin
g 
Ho
urs
 
Sunrise to 
Sunset 
- Easy to enforce as violations are obvious 
- May improve safety of fishers 
- May reduce illegal take 
- Requires adequate staff to enforce over large 
geographical areas 
Fis
hin
g 
Se
aso
ns
 
Spring/Fall 
-Easy to enforce as violations are obvious 
- May improve safety of fishers 
-Gives resources time to recover from 
fishing, and protection during vulnerable 
periods such as spawning times 
- Requires adequate staff to enforce over large 
geographical areas 
Find and 
Replace  
- Protects animals from incidental fishing 
mortality 
Fis
hin
g 
Be
ha
vio
r 
M
ea
su
res
 
High-grading 
Ban 
- Protects animals from incidental fishing 
mortality 
- May be difficult to detect 
No SCUBA 
- Protects individuals in deeper water from 
fishing pressure to maintain a dense breeding 
stock 
- May reduce illegal take Ge
ar 
Re
str
ict
ion
s 
Blunt Pry 
Iron required 
- Reduces incidental fishing related mortality 
from injury 
- May be difficult to detect 
- SCUBA ban does not deter all poachers 
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In addition to banning the use of SCUBA gear and enforcing seasonal 
closures, many other management measures have been implemented in accordance 
with the Abalone Recovery and Management Plan, which was adopted by California 
Fish and Game in December of 2005 (Kashiwada and Taniguchi, 2007).  These 
measures include a daily take limit of three abalone, which is intended to reduce 
point-source fishing impacts.  An annual take limit of twenty-four abalone per fisher 
has also been set in accordance with the TAC levels for the fishery (CDFG, 2005).  
Furthermore, a minimum legal shell length limit of seven inches (178 mm) has been 
introduced to allow abalone to reach sexual maturity and reproduce prior to being 
subjected to fishing mortality (CDFG, 2005).  There are also behavioral regulations 
requiring fishers to replace abalone on the same rock they were taken from if they are 
found to be undersized, and prohibiting the practice of high-grading legal-sized 
abalone (CDFG, 2005).  These measures are meant to reduce unreported fishing-
related mortality. 
Furthermore, managers have also adopted measures which allow them to 
monitor fisher activity.  All abalone fishers are required to purchase an abalone permit 
report card (a.k.a. punch-card) which provides managers with basic information on 
the number of recreational fishers using the resource, where they are fishing, and their 
annual level of take (see Appendix 1).  The punch-card must be purchased in addition 
to a California Fishing license, and it is only valid for one season.  The report card 
contains 24 spaces for fishers to document the date, time, and location code of every 
abalone taken.  Location codes for 56 common abalone collection sites in Marin, 
Sonoma, Mendocino, Humboldt and Del Norte counties are provided on the card, as 
well as instructions and a summary of abalone regulations.  The cards are required by 
law to be returned to the Fort Bragg office of the California Department of Fish and 
Game no later than the 30th of December of the year of purchase.  Managers use a 
random sample of the returned abalone report cards in conjunction with a phone 
survey of fishers who purchased report cards to estimate fisher effort, track the most 
common locations and months of take, and estimate the total legal take for the fishery 
(Kalvass and Geibel, 2006).   
In addition to the data collected with the abalone report card and phone 
survey, the Abalone Recovery and Management Plan states that managers should 
monitor their success by looking at abalone density indicators from index sites in 
northern and southern California (CDFG, 2005).  This fishery-independent biological 
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survey looks at the abalone population at eight key locations, and attempts an estimate 
of overall abalone density, health, mortality, and recruitment at all depths (Rogers-
Bennett et al., 2002; Rogers-Bennett et al., 2007).  The survey uses densities 
determined from transects, and “if densities drop below critical values the ARMP 
either reduces the catch, closes areas, or the entire fishery” (Kashiwada and 
Taniguchi, 2007, p. 713).  The opposite also holds true, so that if densities rise and 
there is good recruitment, the total allowable catch (TAC) could be increased 
(Kashiwada and Taniguchi, 2007; CDFG, 2005).  However as Kashiwada and 
Taniguchi (2007) explain, “the TAC is a guideline rather than a trigger, because there 
are no mechanisms for monitoring in-season catch and for closing the fishery in-
season when TAC is exceeded” (p. 713).   
Currently, management is operating under the “interim plan”, which will last 
until 2011.  The general management strategy of the “interim plan” is to maintain the 
red abalone population above the estimated minimum viable population (MVP) level 
of 3,000 abalone/ha, under which recruitment would not be high enough to sustain the 
population and the total numbers would decline to collapse (Kashiwada and 
Taniguchi, 2007).  A more zonal long-term management plan may be implemented in 
2011 if further funds become available, which would require increased enforcement 
and more detailed assessments of the stocks in order to become less precautionary 
(CDFG, 2005).   
2.7 Information Gaps in Northern California 
 
The methods of assessment currently being used by management may be 
adequate for estimating the annual levels of legal take from the abalone fishery, but 
they are insufficient with respect to illegal take.  Despite all enforcement efforts to 
combat the drivers of non-compliance, and the encouragement of the Abalone 
Recovery and Management Plan to include “estimates of illegal harvest as part of the 
total fishery-related mortalities”, no method for accurately estimating non-compliance 
is currently being used ( CDFG, 2005, p. Appendix F-12).  While documenting catch 
with the abalone report card system is required by law, individuals are usually wary of 
confessing illegal behavior via self-reporting methods (Warner, 1965).  The Abalone 
Enforcement Report for 2006 stated that violations for wrongly reporting catch on 
abalone report cards were the most commonly encountered at fishing sites and vehicle 
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checkpoints (Riske, 2006).  In essence, the deterrence system in place to discourage 
illegal behavior also discourages fishers from being honest on their abalone report 
cards, for fear of penalties.  As a result, this method for increasing the information 
available to managers about legal take does not provide managers with information 
about illegal take levels. 
The shortage of information about the actual level of non-compliance 
undermines management in several ways.  Without non-compliance estimates or 
estimates of illegal take, managers operate with imprecise estimates of Total Catch, 
increasing their response time to potential threats (Sumaila et al., 2006).  Management 
is forced to rely on “crude estimates [of non-compliance]…made from warden 
intercept data” and changes in red abalone “population densities during dive surveys” 
(CDFG, 2005, p. Appendix F-12).  These estimation methods are imprecise, costly, 
take significant time to analyze, and still do not provide management with all the 
information that would allow them to effectively influence the compliance drivers.  
Furthermore, data collected from warden citation reports are not collated and made 
available to managers, so even this imprecise gauge of the level of illegal activity is 
not fully utilized (Combes, CDFG Warden, pers. comm., November, 2007).   
As a result, managers do not currently have reliable estimates of which 
regulations are experiencing the highest proportions of non-compliance, which would 
allow them to assess the effectiveness of regulatory measures for protecting abalone 
resources, and set efficient enforcement priorities. With information about what 
proportion of fishers are non-compliant, what kinds of violations are most common, 
which sectors violate, and how fisher awareness of regulations affects their decision 
to violate, management can assess how best to tailor abalone measures to their 
resource users (Hønneland, 1999). This thesis seeks to address this critical 
information gap by collecting primary data on these questions for the red abalone 
fishery of Northern California. 
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Chapter 3  
Methodology 
 
 
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
This methodology section outlines the procedures used for data collection and 
analysis.  To obtain data for Objectives 1 and 2 I utilize a survey of abalone fishers.  
The survey technique, called the randomized response technique (RRT), is unique in 
that it allows researchers to attain a higher proportion of honest responses to sensitive 
questions than direct surveying methods.  Each objective and the methods used to 
achieve it are described in some detail. 
 
3.2 Site Location 
 
Data collection for Objectives 1 and 2 was conducted in Mendocino and 
Sonoma Counties in Northern California (shown in white in Figure 3.1).  The eight 
sites surveyed were chosen because they are commonly used coastal access points for 
recreational abalone fishers along Highway 1 (See Figure 3.2).  The Northern 
Californian red abalone fishery provides an excellent area from which to draw this 
case study for three reasons.  The first is the high value of the red abalone as a species 
both economically and for conservation purposes.  Abalone meat fetches a high price 
in domestic and international markets, leading to greater incentives to engage in 
illegal recreational take, particularly in this fishery where there is no longer a 
commercial industry (Daniels and Floren, 1998).  Additionally, the red abalone is also 
of great value for conservation purposes, as it is the only abalone species to maintain 
relatively high abundance in California despite the collapse of almost all of the seven 
other native abalone species (CDFG, 2005). 
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Figure 3.1 California County Map 
 
The second reason this area was an ideal location for this study is the current 
level of regulatory management, and the resulting information that exists on the status 
of the species.  The fishery is monitored by managers, enforcement officers and 
biologists, who were able to provide me with information about the red abalone 
fishery, including data on fishing effort biological indicators of stock health.  This 
information was useful because it showed that while the fishery may or may not be 
sustainable, it certainly suffers from information gaps pertaining to estimating the 
impact of illegal take, and thus would benefit from further study. 
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Figure 3.2 Survey Site Map (adapted from Kalvass and Geibel, 2006) 
 
Finally, the accessibility of the fishery both topographically and socially made 
it an ideal location to conduct a case study using the randomized response technique.  
Sonoma and Mendocino counties represent 96% of the annual red abalone effort, and 
due to the steep and rocky shoreline, that take is largely point source (CDFG, 1993).  
This feature allowed for easy recognition of coastal access points by both fishers and 
researchers, and provided facilities such as parking lots where fishers congregate and 
surveys could easily be administered.  Additionally, the area has a very high literacy 
rate and is primarily English speaking, which made for ideal survey conditions (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2008, http://quickfacts.census.gov). 
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3.3 Survey – Objectives 1 and 2 
3.3.1 Sample Design 
 
   Four sites were sampled in Mendocino County and four in Sonoma County.  
Fifteen red abalone fishers were asked to give feedback on the survey method during 
a week-long piloting phase, but their surveys were not analyzed.  These fishers 
thought non-compliant locals would not be likely to violate at the larger, more popular 
sites, because they are more regularly patrolled by game wardens, and have more 
people present who may report violators.  On the other hand, it was thought visiting 
fishers who were not as familiar with the coast would likely use and potentially 
violate at the large sites.  The large sites represented the areas with the highest overall 
percentage of take, therefore they were expected to have a higher expected percentage 
of violations than the small sites. 
In order to get a complete cross section of the abalone fishing community, it 
was important to sample from both the more accessible “high take” sites, as well as 
the “low take” areas (see Table 3.1).  To accomplish this I randomly selected four 
“high take” sites from the top ten sites in 2002, as reported by fisher report cards.  
Additionally, three  “low take” sites that were rated between 10 and 25 in terms of 
take were selected, as well as one “low take” site designated “miscellaneous small” 
where several very small Mendocino sites (rated between 25 and 35 for take) were 
surveyed in a day (Kalvass and Geibel, 2006).    
 
Table 3.1: Survey Locations and Take Levels 
(Adapted from Kalvass and Geibel, 2006) 
 
Location Name County Annual Percentage Abalone Take Site Designation 
Van Damme State Park Mendocino 6.83 “high take” 
Reef Campground (Pedotti) Sonoma 6.02 “high take” 
Sea Ranch Sonoma 5.49 “high take” 
Arena Cove Mendocino 4.79 “high take” 
Elk Mendocino 3.12 “low take” 
Fisk Mill Cove Sonoma 2.67 “low take” 
Stillwater Cove Sonoma 1.38 “low take” 
Miscellaneous small Mendocino  “low take” 
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The highest fishing effort in the red abalone (H. rufescens) fishery occurs in 
the summer months, and the month of August has the second highest reported take 
after June (CDFG, 2007b).  However, recent studies are showing a shift in fishing 
effort toward collecting in the later half of the season (August to November) rather 
than April to June (Riske, 2006).  Thus, the survey period was the five weeks from 
Friday August 10th to Saturday September 8th, 2007, with a week of survey piloting 
the last week of June. 
The sites were assigned specific survey dates in advance by multi-strata semi-
random selection (see Appendix 2).  Weekends experience higher fishing effort than 
weekdays, so these days needed to be equitably distributed among low and high take 
sites.  This was accomplished by randomly assigning each site one of the eight 
weekend days.  Labor Day (a 3-day holiday weekend) fell on the second to last 
weekend of the survey, and sites were randomly selected for that Monday.  Fridays 
were considered medium traffic days, and were randomly split between high and low 
take sites.  Mondays through Thursdays are characterized by low fishing effort, and 
sites were randomly assigned for those days.  
 
3.3.2 The Randomized Response Technique 
 
The methods currently used to gather information on the level of illegal 
abalone harvest in Northern California are insufficient.  Managers have generally 
relied upon data from conservation enforcement (e.g. number of arrests or fines), pre-
notified vehicle search roadblocks, or direct questioning via phone surveys to derive 
estimates of illegal fishing activity (Kalvass and Geibel, 2006).  Unfortunately, each 
of these methods has been shown to greatly underestimate the actual amount of illegal 
activity (Buchman and Tracy, 1982, Fox and Tracy, 1986).   
The most straightforward way to determine the proportion of fishers who 
illegally fish for abalone is to ask them directly using an anonymous survey.  
However, when discussing illegal activity, the effectiveness of traditional direct 
questioning techniques is reduced, because those being interviewed fear retribution or 
punishment for admitting they have acted illegally (Locander et al., 1976, Fowler and 
Mangione, 1990).  As Buchman and Tracy (1982) explain, “researchers are faced with 
two problems when posing sensitive questions to respondents…[either] they refuse to 
respond,…[or] they will return misleading responses designed to conceal the 
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unacceptable behavior” (p. 264).   Respondents who give evasive or dishonest 
answers introduce response bias into the study, resulting in questionable data and poor 
results (Warner, 1965; Solomon et al., 2007).  When faced with this problem, 
researchers using the traditional direct questioning survey method are likely to try to 
gain the confidence of the respondent (Warner, 1965).  However, this is unreliable, 
because many people will not be inclined to confide certain things at all, and others 
would not want their confessions written down or linked to them in any way (Warner, 
1965). 
The randomized response technique (RRT) was developed over forty years 
ago to counter these problems with response bias, by increasing the number of honest 
answers given to sensitive questions in a survey or interview.  Sensitive questions 
may be defined as “questions that demand answers that are too revealing” (Warner, 
1965, p. 63).  Solomon et al. (2007) describe them as those questions which 
participants in the study perceive as having a cost, be it financial or personal.  RRT 
allows the responses of interviewees to remain anonymous, and gives respondents 
control of the questions, thereby reducing the perceived costs (Buchman and Tracy, 
1982).  As Warner (1965) states, “the method is built on the premise that cooperation 
should be naturally better if the questions allow answers which reveal less even to the 
interviewer” (p. 63).  This is accomplished through the design of the method, which 
allows a “yes” response to either be the sensitive response the researcher seeks, or the 
answer to an unrelated innocuous question (Buchman and Tracy, 1982; Fox and 
Tracy, 1986).  Thus, the interviewee responds with information that gives the 
researcher data only on a probability basis (Warner, 1965).   
The method begins with the respondent performing a randomizing process, 
such as flipping a coin or rolling a die, prior to answering each of the questions.  They 
then randomly select one of two question cards, but do not reveal it to anyone else.  
The question will either be the sensitive question, or an unrelated innocuous question 
pertaining to the outcome of the randomizing process.  The respondents’ reply of 
“yes” or “no” is recorded either by themselves or the researcher.  At the end of the 
process, the researcher does not know which question was answered.  However they 
do know the probability of each outcome: the probability of flipping “heads” or 
“tails” with a coin, and the probability of drawing each of the cards (Buchman and 
Tracy, 1982). Therefore, the researcher can tally the number of “yes” replies to find 
the proportion of sensitive questions the entire sample answered, but can not say with 
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any certainty whether an individual respondent who gave a positive reply was 
answering the sensitive or innocuous question (Solomon et al., 2007).  Solomon et al. 
(2007, p. 6) state “in essence the technique is useful in developing aggregate estimates 
of illegal behavior”. 
 Since RRT uses probability, it does have larger standard error than direct 
questioning, requiring a larger sample size (Buchman and Tracy, 1982).  As Buchman 
and Tracy (1982) explain, “the larger standard error of RRT is caused by two sources 
of sample error – the variation in the sample proportion that is directed to answer 
yes…and the variation in the sample proportion that answers yes to the sensitive 
question (which is the typical sample error problem)” (p. 266).  However, even with a 
larger standard error, Buchman and Tracy (1982) found “RRT questionnaires [show] 
a tendency toward more honest answers” ( p. 268).  A meta-analysis of 37 studies that 
used the randomized response technique “indicated an overall positive effect for RRT 
across studies compared to other methods” (Lensvelt-Mulders et al., 2005, p. 319).  
Furthermore, others who have tested the method have also found it estimates a greater 
proportion of sensitive behavior than standard survey and interview methods (Warner, 
1965; I-Cheng et al., 1972; Dowling and Shachtman, 1975; Goodstadt and Gruson, 
1975; Berrens et al., 1997; Chaloupka, 1985; Solomon et al., 2007).   
This method has been used in a variety of studies of sensitive issues ranging 
from abortion rates to tax evasion, and more recently, illegal resource use (I-Cheng et 
al., 1972; Chaloupka, 1985; Schill and Kline, 1995; Solomon et al., 2007).  It was 
used in Australia by Chaloupka (1985) to look at shell collection permit compliance 
within the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, and resulted in an estimate of 17.5% non-
compliance with permit conditions.  The study emphasized the validity of the 
randomized response technique for this kind of research, and stressed the 
recommendation that marine managers “should not unreservedly base management 
decisions on usage data derived simply from permit[s]” (Chaloupka, 1985, p. 393).  
The method was later used by Schill and Kline (1995) of the Idaho Department of 
Fish and Game in the United States to look at angling gear compliance around several 
rivers and lakes.  These authors also concluded that RRT was a “viable method for 
estimating rates of angler non-compliance with regulations” (Schill and Kline, 1995, 
p. 721).  More recently, it was used by Solomon et al. (2007) to estimate illegal 
resource use in Kibale National Park, Uganda, who found it estimated significantly 
more illegal resource use than traditional methods.  Thus, this method seemed very 
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well suited to a study focusing on illegal fishing issues even though no marine 
fisheries studies have been conducted using RRT thus far. 
Furthermore, the randomized response technique is very well suited to the red 
abalone (Haliotis rufescens) recreational fishery, because the high level of fines and 
enforcement mean that respondents would perceive a high cost of honestly answering 
sensitive questions with traditional survey methods.  Thus, these methods would 
doubtlessly be rendered useless by evasive answers and low response rates.  As 
discussed, RRT was chosen because it allows respondents to disclose sensitive 
information without the interviewer knowing the exact response to the incriminating 
question, and is thus, a unique way to attain much more accurate information 
regarding the proportion of fishers illegally taking red abalone in California. 
In addition to more accurately estimating proportions of sensitive behavior 
than other methods, the randomized response technique has other unique benefits that 
make it well suited to collecting data on illegal research use.  For example, it is cost-
effective compared to many of the other illegal fishing estimation tools discussed in 
the introduction section (Wahl, 1995).  RRT uses very few materials so it may be 
conducted on location by the resource collection area itself.  The format of the survey 
is technically simple and understandable, and the method can be taught quickly to 
research aids.  RRT also has the advantage of being easily adapted for areas and 
populations with low literacy rates (Solomon et al., 2007). 
A survey which uses the randomized response technique may also be easily 
combined with a standard survey to collect further information about respondent 
behavior and background.  This study was designed to correlate RRT responses with 
other questions about fishing experience and socio-demographics.  This is the first 
time RRT has been used to try to identify characteristics of the non-compliant section 
of the population by linking variables collected with a standard paper-based survey to 
RRT responses.    
 
3.3.3 RRT Survey Data Collection 
3.3.3.1 Recruitment 
 
The average time spent at the sites each day was 4 hours, with effort focused 
on the early morning low tide from sunrise to approximately 11:00am, when most 
recreational fishers collect abalone.  
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Respondents were selected randomly on-site.  The first person to exit their 
vehicle and be identified as an abalone fisher was approached for the survey.  If the 
car contained more than three abalone divers every third person was also approached. 
Fishers were identified by their clothing (e.g. wetsuits) or by their abalone fishing 
gear (e.g. pry irons or inner-tubes).  The respondents had no prior knowledge of the 
survey and no identifying information was taken.  They were recruited by myself or 
an assistant with a predetermined procedure.  That procedure was written in advance 
and is reported here: 
 
• Greet potential respondents with a smile: “Hi! I am (or My friend is) a student 
in New Zealand doing a project on abalone fishing, are you going out for 
abalone today?” (If YES continue) 
-If NO then: “Do you go abalone fishing?” (If YES continue) 
-If NO then thank them, note it, and move on to the next person. 
 
• Explain yourself: “Would you mind filling out a quick survey for my school 
project, it’s anonymous and will take less than 10 minutes?”  
 
• If the respondent seems nervous or hesitant assure them you are not an official 
or in any way there for enforcement.  And stress how quick and anonymous it 
will be.  If they say NO that is okay, note it, and move on to the next person. 
 
• If they say YES, make sure the respondent has not already been surveyed and 
let them know you do NOT want to know their name at any point. 
 
• Ask the respondent to walk over to the survey area and AWAY from other 
members of their party and/or others being surveyed. 
 
• Give them an information sheet on Victoria University letterhead. 
 
• Thank them for agreeing to participate and hand them a pencil and survey. 
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The survey was administered as far away from other abalone divers or members 
of the respondent’s group as possible in order to avoid introducing response bias by 
allowing other divers to overhear the survey who may themselves be surveyed 
afterwards.  It was also important to keep the person being surveyed away from those 
who might offer them help answering the questions. 
Informed consent was attained verbally once the respondent had been given 
information sheet about the study and had been directly asked if they would like to 
participate (see Appendix 3).  Attaining written consent to participate in the research 
was impossible due to the sensitive nature of the questions and the necessity of 
anonymity for RRT (Ethics Committee Approval #75/2007).   
 
3.3.3.2 Survey Administration 
 
The data were collected using a paper survey form that combined a 
randomized response technique portion to collect data for Objective 1 as well as a 
portion testing fisher awareness of abalone regulations and socio-demographic 
information to collect data for the second objective (see Appendix 4).  Once consent 
to participate was attained, the respondent was given their copy of the survey form on 
a clipboard, a U.S. quarter, a pencil with eraser, and seven numbered envelopes 
containing the RRT and innocuous questions.  The survey method was explained with 
a set protocol to ensure all respondents were given the same information about how to 
self administer the survey.  The respondent was first told how to complete the RRT 
section, because piloting showed that respondents were less inclined to complete the 
RRT section if it was not administered first.  The method was explained and 
demonstrated to the respondent according to the following protocol: 
 
1. Show them the RRT section of the survey first, and explain the procedure 
as you demonstrate the method. 
2. Show them the coin must be flipped BEFORE they begin EACH 
QUESTION, and the result should NOT be revealed to anyone besides 
themselves. 
3. Show them the two question cards in the envelopes and let them see that 
there is one question about the coin toss, and one question about abalone 
fishing in each envelope, and all the cards are identical in appearance.  
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4. Explain that they have  an equal chance of  drawing either of the cards 
and since they look the same, no one watching can tell which one they 
have. 
5. Let them watch you place the cards inside the empty numbered envelopes. 
6. Tell them after they flip the coin they should  randomly draw a question 
card from the numbered  envelope that corresponds to the question 
number on the survey, but they must not show or read their question to 
anyone else. 
7. Tell them to answer the question by circling “yes” or “no” on the survey 
form. 
8. Instruct them to put the question back inside the envelope BEFORE 
handing it back to you.  
9. Explain before they begin the survey that no one can tell whether they 
answered the sensitive question or not by looking only at their survey 
form. Emphasize that they can be totally honest because their answers are 
anonymous. 
10. Ask if they have any questions about how to complete the RRT portion of 
the survey. 
11. Tell them to fold their survey when they have completed the RRT section 
and continue with the questions inside. 
12. Let them know they only need to complete the questions they feel 
comfortable answering regarding ethnicity, income, age, etc. and may 
leave things blank if they want to. 
13. Tell them to deliver their form to the ballot box when they finish. 
14. Ask them if they have any other questions.  If not, tell them they may begin 
the survey. 
15. Walk a distance away, but casually observe them to ensure they are 
flipping the coin each time and drawing questions randomly. 
16. When they have completed the survey thank them for agreeing to 
participate, and encourage them to take the information sheet if they are 
interested in requesting the results of the study or contacting me. 
 
Two research assistants, Kelly Thomasson and Joy Radecki, were trained by 
myself on the survey technique.  They administered surveys at the same site I was 
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administering them so that initially they could be supervised.  The weekends had 
significantly higher traffic at the sites than weekdays, so research assistants were 
needed to keep up with the pace of vehicles and divers entering the sites and increase 
efficiency.   
The surveys were collected in a large clear plastic box, ballot-box style, in 
order to provide respondents with even greater confidence in the anonymity of the 
survey.  They were able to see the other identical surveys inside, and could shake the 
box to mix their survey in with the others.  After the surveys were administered and 
collected in the ballot box, fishers would frequently engage in informal conversation 
about the topics raised by the survey.  Notes were made at the end of each day 
regarding the themes of these discussions. 
 
3.3.3.3 Survey Instrument 
 
The survey was composed of three sections: randomized response technique 
(RRT) questions about illegal abalone fishing behavior; questions related to the 
respondent’s awareness of regulations, and abalone collecting experience; and socio-
demographic and economic questions (see Appendix 4).  The first thesis objective, to 
utilize the RRT to determine proportions of illegal recreational fishing of red abalone 
and analyze variables of the fishing population, was addressed using both the first 
section, with RRT, and the last section of socio-demographic questions.  RRT 
responses have not previously been correlated to demographic or experience variables 
in other RRT studies.  The middle section, on fisher awareness of abalone regulations, 
targeted my second thesis objective.  Using data from all three sections, an estimate of 
the proportion of violators would be analyzed against regulation awareness and 
demographic questions to more clearly distinguish different characteristics of the 
fishers surveyed.  This allowed the specific research questions under the first and 
second thesis objectives to be addressed via an analysis of trends of violation.   
 
The Randomized Response Technique 
 
It was decided that the RRT section was better if given first for several 
reasons.  RRT results were considered the most vital to the survey, and since 
respondents were often in a rush, it made sense to get this information before fatigue 
 44 
with the survey process set in and they ceased to read the questions as carefully.  
Secondly, the RRT method only gives respondents a 50% chance of drawing each of 
the sensitive questions about regulations, unlike the direct questions in the knowledge 
section.  Therefore, it is less leading than direct questions, because respondents may 
draw the innocuous question and not be influenced by the limit numbers on the 
sensitive question cards.  Finally, the RRT section required respondents to flip a coin 
and reach into several bags, while also writing down their responses; piloting showed 
respondents more willing to go through the procedure if it came before they had filled 
out the other sections.  When the order of the sections was reversed in piloting, the 
response rate fell, and several respondents only filled out half of the survey declining 
to do the RRT portion.  
I used the paired-alternative RRT format, that Fox and Tracy (1986) call the 
“two unrelated questions” technique.  The seven RRT questions and the innocuous 
question were printed in English on plain white index cards and placed inside seven 
identical large manila envelopes.  When the question cards showed wear they were 
replaced with identical new ones.  The questions in the RRT section are listed in 
Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Randomized Response Technique Survey Questions 
RRT 1 Do you have a valid fishing license for collecting abalone? 
RRT 2 In the past year have you ever taken abalone under the minimum legal size limit? 
RRT 3 Did you take more than 24 abalone total last season? 
RRT 4 In the past year have you ever taken more than 3 abalone per day? 
RRT 5 In the past year have you ever taken more than 6 abalone per day? 
RRT 6 In the past year have you ever taken more than 9 abalone per day? 
RRT 7 In the past year have you ever taken more than 12 abalone per day? 
Innocuous Did you get heads on the coin toss? 
 
 
Socio-Demographic Survey 
 
The questions included in the Socio-demographic section of the survey 
gathered further information about those who utilize the abalone resources in 
California.  This information provided a means of verifying how representative the 
sample was of the total recreational abalone fishing population.  The multiple-choice 
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options given for ethnicity and income were modeled on those in the California 
Census, as well as those used by the California Department of Fish and Game for their 
phone survey of abalone fishers (Kalvass and Geibel, 2006, U.S. Census Bureau, 
2008, http://quickfacts.census.gov ).  I provided fishers with more income ranges to 
choose from than Fish and Game provide during their phone survey.   Comparisons to 
average fisher incomes estimated by Fish and Game are possible, but the ranges in my 
survey provide the clearest possible picture of the income distribution of my 
respondents.   
Questions on county of residence and age were also included to establish 
response trends, and address Research Question 1.1.  These research questions 
required the use of demographic information on county of residence, age, income, and 
ethnicity to find out if they were significantly correlated to the likelihood of illegal 
fishing.  Logistic regression analysis on age, county of residence, and other 
demographic information against RRT responses were to be used in the data analysis 
to determine any trends. The ratio of locals to visitors would also be used for 
verification of the data, because the California Department of Fish and Game collects 
this information as well. 
 
3.3.4 Regulation Awareness Survey 
 
This section of the survey was included to address thesis Objective 2 and 
establish whether there were any information gaps present between the California 
Department of Fish and Game and the users of the resource itself.  It sought to 
establish firstly whether fishers knew there were regulations on size, daily take, and 
annual take.  Then, if they knew there were regulations, it sought to determine 
whether they knew the specific limits.  This information could illustrate if 
management needs to make it a priority to improve the communication of regulations 
to fishers. 
Questions regarding fishing experience and fishing effort for the year 2006 
were included in this section as well.  These questions were intended to illustrate a 
possible link between fishing experience, awareness of regulations, and illegal use.  
This information could clarify if the regulation awareness of more seasoned fishers is 
different to novice fishers.  Fishing effort in the previous season could also be tied to 
awareness in this way. 
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3.4 Semi-Structured Interviews – Objective 3 
 
3.4.1 Sample Design 
 
In order to get more information on the priorities and perspectives of red 
abalone experts, three semi-structured individual interviews were conducted via 
phone.  The persons used for these interviews have direct roles in abalone 
management, research, and enforcement.   
Dr. Laura Rogers-Bennett is a Senior Biologist Specialist (Marine/Fisheries) 
with the California Department of Fish and Game.  Her research primarily 
investigates the biology and ecology of abalone and urchins, and she was one of the 
preparers of the Abalone Recovery and Management Plan (2005).  She published six 
articles in 2007, on topics ranging from red abalone (Haliotis rufesens) growth and 
mortality, to an abalone enforcement method (Rogers-Bennett, Rogers, and Schultz, 
2007; Rogers-Bennett and Melvin, 2007). 
Peter Kalvass is a Senior Marine Biologist with the California Department of 
Fish and Game who primarily focuses on invertebrate fisheries management.  His 
current role involves, amongst other things, deriving estimates of fisher catch and 
effort for the recreational abalone fishery, through a combined abalone report card 
and telephone survey (Kalvass and Geibel, 2006).  He was also one of the preparers of 
the Abalone Recovery and Management Plan (2005), and the information he collects 
about the recreational fishery is vital to setting catch limits under that plan. 
Gary Combes is a Warden for the California Department of Fish and Game.  
He patrols Mendocino County, where he contacts resource users to enforce 
regulations as well as to educate the public about coastal resources and management 
provisions.  His personal experience with abalone fishers, knowledge enforcement 
techniques, and frequent contact with non-compliant individuals gives him a unique 
perspective on the status of the fishery and the success of management measures. 
When each individual was approached for the interview, they were emailed an 
information sheet about the study, the general topics which would be addressed in the 
interview, and a copy of the participation consent form (Appendix 5).  Participation 
with the interview was completely voluntary.  Quotes were only attributed to 
interviewees who specifically consented and initialed that they would allow it, 
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otherwise it was explained that all comments would be kept confidential.  The consent 
forms were signed prior to the interviews and were mailed back. 
 
3.4.2 Interview Data Collection 
 
The interviews lasted an average of 35 minutes, and covered topics 
surrounding illegal abalone harvest and abalone management concerns.  A semi-
structured interview method was chosen because it allows for some structure, while 
not limiting the responses of the interviewees.  In this way it gets the responses that 
are at the fore-front of each person’s mind, without putting words in their mouth by 
offering multiple-choice, or allowing the interviewer to exercise excessive control 
(Bernard, 2002). In addition, the casual style of semi-structured interviews allows for 
more relaxed responses and creativity, which was desirable when asking for suggested 
improvements to management (Bernard, 2002).  Furthermore, the experts interviewed 
were very busy and so an expedient interview format was desirable.  A semi-
structured method was therefore considered appropriate, because the literature 
recommends it for interviewing “elite members of a community…who are 
accustomed to efficient use of their time” (Bernard, 2002, p.205).    
A question which asked the interviewees to rate a list of seven common 
abalone violations according to that person’s perceptions of the greatest threats to 
abalone in their region was emailed to the interviewees prior to their interview.  They 
were advised to rate them from high to low before the interview and to think about 
those issues.  Then, during the interview itself, their responses were recorded and 
discussed as the interview progressed.  The list of violations included behaviors such 
as high-grading, failure to reattach abalone, daily take limit violations, annual take 
limit violations, minimum size limit violations, failure to document take, and failure 
to document location of take (see Appendix 6).  Any quotes I wished to use were 
authorized by interviewees via email prior to inclusion in this thesis. 
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3.5 Data Analysis  
 
3.5.1 Survey Data Analysis 
 
After the data were collected, a simple probability equation was used to 
determine the number of users who answered “yes” to the sensitive question (see 
Equation 1).  Figure 3.2 indicates four possible responses to the standard two question 
set.  With the large sample size obtained the probability of getting heads on the coin 
toss is 0.5.  Similarly, the probability of drawing the innocuous question is also 0.5.  
Therefore, the probability of “yes” responses to the innocuous question is 0.5 × 0.5 = 
0.25. The study focuses on getting at the number of “yes” replies to the sensitive 
question, but must first remove those who answered “yes” to the innocuous question.  
The RRT formula from Fox and Tracy (1986) was used to calculate the proportion of 
fishers engaging in illegal take: 
 
Equation 1:  RRT Probability Equation (Fox and Tracy, 1986) 
 
 
Xx  = ( [ – (1-p) y ] / p ) 
 
Equation 2: RRT Sample Variance Equation (Fox and Tracy, 1986)  
 
 
Var(Xx) = (1-)/np2 
 
 
y = known proportion of non-sensitive behavior  
 
 = recorded proportion of “yes” responses 
 
p = probability of selecting the sensitive question 
 
n = number of respondents  
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Figure 3.3: RRT Probability Grid 
 
Equations 1 and 2 were used to estimate violation proportions and variance for 
the general population surveyed (Objective 1), and for local fishers versus visitors 
(Research Question 1.1) with 95% confidence intervals.  For Research Question 1.2, a 
Mann-Whitney Test of significance was used to analyze the observed differences in 
age, fishing experience, and frequency of fishing trips the previous season between 
those who gave “yes” responses and those who did not.  This method was the most 
appropriate as RRT estimates proportions of violations, and is not designed to give the 
researcher the exact number of respondents who answered with the target reply to the 
sensitive question.  Therefore, it can be informative to look at descriptive statistics to 
help identify trends in the characteristics of respondents who answered positively 
against those that gave a negative reply. 
Further analysis of the RRT data against fisher traits for Research Question 
1.2 used a backward stepwise likelihood ratio binary logistic regression to model non-
compliant behavior using socio-demographic variables.  The variables included in the 
analysis were fisher age, income, seasons fishing, times fishing in 2006, and county of 
residence.  This model was chosen because some of the variables, particularly income 
and age, were correlated.  Therefore a backward stepwise likelihood ratio regression 
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was the best option to help pick apart the influences of each variable, as opposed to a 
backward Wald logistic regression (Field, 2005).    
Research Question 2.1 was addressed by calculating the percentage of fishers 
who answered the regulation awareness questions correctly, incorrectly, or 
incompletely.  Research Question 2.2 used a Mann-Whitney U test to illustrate any 
significant differences in the mean awareness levels of fishers who replied “yes” 
versus “no” to the RRT questions.  A cross-tabulation was also used to look for 
relationships between answering incorrectly to the regulation awareness questions and 
the likelihood of answering with the target response to the RRT questions.  
 
3.5.2 Interview Data Analysis 
 
 The information gathered during the semi-structured interviews contributes to 
Objective 3.  The responses of interviewees provide quotes regarding managerial 
priorities within the abalone fishery, the effectiveness of current management 
techniques for maintaining red abalone, and the impact and assessment of illegal 
resource use.  The responses of interviewees to the ranking question are used to 
support this discussion, but due to the small number of experts interviewed, they are 
not analyzed quantitatively.  
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Chapter 4  
Results and Analysis 
 
 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
This section presents information from three semi-structured interviews 
regarding the priorities of abalone experts in Northern California, as well as 
randomized response technique data and socio-demographic information from a fisher 
survey.  
 
4.2 Outcomes from Semi-Structured Interviews 
  
Three semi-structured interviews were used to gain information regarding the 
priorities of red abalone experts to inform the third objective.  The interviewees were 
given a rating question which was used to illustrate the importance they placed on 
different types of violations.  All three interviewees rated annual take limit violations 
as a high threat, illustrating that it is the greatest concern of the violation types 
provided.  Daily limit violations were rated the second highest threat, followed by 
minimum size limits, failure to reattach abalone, and high-grading.  Failure to 
document take was rated differently by each interviewee, but there was agreement 
that failure to document take location was a low threat.  Gary Combes added that 
altering the abalone report card to under-represent take is a very low threat, but one he 
regularly encounters.  He went on to rank the violation types he most frequently 
encounters in the field while patrolling (see Table 4.1). 
Once the rating question had been discussed, the interviewees were asked to 
describe the greatest threats to red abalone in Northern California.  All three of them 
agreed that poaching poses the greatest threat.  Dr. Rogers-Bennett elaborated by 
saying that there is not a big problem with disease in the north, because water 
temperatures are low enough that symptoms of withering syndrome (“Canidatus 
Xenohaliotids californiensis”) are not expressed (Friedman et al, 2000; Bower, 2003).  
She also said natural predation by the California sea otter is not a problem at this time, 
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because otters have not made a good recovery in the northern part of the state.  
Warden Gary Combes ruled out pollution as a major threat, stating that coastal waters 
are in good condition in Northern California.   
 
Table 4.1: Violation Encounter Frequencies of Warden Gary Combes 
Frequency Violation Type 
1 (Most) Daily Take Limit Violations 
2 Failure to Re-Attach Abalone 
3 Failure to Document Abalone Take 
4 High Grading 
5 Failure to Document Abalone Location 
6 Minimum Size Limit Violations 
7 Annual Take Limit Violations 
8 (Least) Altering of Abalone Report Card 
 
 
Overall, despite admitting that illegal take is having a negative impact on 
abalone management, all three interviewees felt the current abalone limits are 
working.  Peter Kalvass stated “From what I can see it seems like [the abalone 
population] is okay.  There are no red flags from index dive stations and estimated 
legal take is lower than historical levels”.  Warden Gary Combes went on to say “I 
feel that in terms of compliance the current system is pretty good”.  However, the 
interviewees were also in general agreement that the current methods for estimating 
non-compliance are insufficient and inaccurate.  Warden Gary Combes said the 
current estimates “are just guesses from enforcement data and roadblocks”, and Peter 
Kalvass stated that “estimates of illegal take only mean something to management if 
they are accurate”.  Dr. Laura Rogers-Bennett explained that an accurate illegal take 
estimate would be very important to management, because it could be added on to the 
legal take to estimate the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and set management targets 
that would be more sustainable.   
In order to ascertain how management is currently monitoring illegal take, the 
interviewees were asked which data collection methods are the most useful.  The 
responses given by interviewees varied widely.  Dr. Laura Rogers-Bennett said 
citation data from big busts of poachers gets at the commercial side of illegal take, 
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while roadblocks help managers get a feel for the more moderate low-level re-
occurring violations.  Peter Kalvass said the fishery-independent biological surveys 
are useful for looking at the overall health of the stocks, while the telephone surveys 
gather information from the “cheaters”.  Finally, Warden Combes thought experience 
was one of the most important ways to monitor illegal activity.  He feels the 
familiarity wardens have with common locations of illegal take, rosters of known 
violators, and communication with other wardens is important for staying on top of 
violation levels.  All three respondents agreed that new methods for gathering 
information about illegal activity within the fishery would be very helpful. 
Overall, the interviewees indicated that the framework of the current system is 
good, but there are gaps where further information could improve the sustainable 
management of red abalone.  The rating question indicated that violations of fisher 
take regulations (e.g. annual, daily, and size limits) threaten the resource and are 
therefore of greatest interest to these abalone experts.  
 
4.3 Fisher Survey Results 
 
4.3.1 Response Rates  
 
Three hundred and forty fishers were approached to participate in this survey.  
The final response rate was 82% (279 of 340 approched).  Approximately 0.8% of the 
total abalone fishing population of 35,180 were surveyed (Kalvass, 2007).  Response 
rates for the survey were affected by the ability of the respondent to speak and read 
English, and 8% of the abalone fishers who were approached, primarily those of 
Asian descent, did not participate for language reasons.  The lack of representative 
data for this group introduced some cultural bias into the data, which could have been 
remedied by conducting the survey with a translator to explain the procedure to 
respondents and by translating the survey form.  However, due to budget constraints 
and the lack of available translators, translation was not possible for this project.  The 
survey took respondents an average of eight minutes to complete.   
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4.3.2 Respondent Socio-Demographics 
  
Socio-demographic questions were included in the survey in order to assess 
whether the survey respondents were representative of the overall abalone fisher 
population, as well as to allow for an analysis of how these traits may affect reported 
rates of violation. 
  
4.3.2.1 Income 
 
The distribution of fisher income from the survey is comparable to that found 
in telephone surveys conducted by the California Department of Fish and Game 
(Kalvass, 2007).  The average annual income of fishers surveyed was $51,000-
$75,000, with over half of fishers reporting incomes between $26,000 and $75,000 
(See Figure 4.1).  Fish and Game report an average fisher income of $60,000-$90,000 
(Kalvass, 2007).  Both the survey and Fish and Game statistics estimate the average 
income of abalone fishers to be above the California state average of $49,894 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2008, http://quickfacts.census.gov ). 
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Figure 4.1 Average Incomes of Survey Respondents 
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4.3.2.2 Ethnicity and Gender 
 
As discussed earlier, this study under-represents the Asian population because 
of language barriers to participation in the survey.  This shortage of data on Asian 
fishers would result in inaccurate conclusions about the importance of ethnicity in 
influencing the likelihood of illegal behavior.  Thus, the data were not used for 
statistical modeling.  The ethnic composition of survey respondents is illustrated in 
Figure 4.2.   
Gender was also excluded from the analysis because there was an 
overwhelming majority of 92% male respondents to the survey.  This proportion 
accurately represents the makeup of the abalone fishing community, but the small 
sampling of female fishers made an isolated investigation of any gender effects on 
RRT data patterns impossible.  
74%
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Figure 4.2: Respondent Ethnicities 
 
4.3.2.3 Fishing Experience and Age 
 
In order to target Research Question 1.2, and determine whether a certain 
sector of the recreational fishing population engages in illegal red abalone take more 
than others, several demographic and fishing experience questions were asked. 
Questions were included in the survey about respondents’ ages, the number of seasons 
they have been an abalone fisher, and how many times they fished during the previous 
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season in 2006 (see Table 4.2).  California Fish and Game estimated a mean fisher 
effort of 3.15 days in 2005 which is comparable to my mean answer of 4 days fished 
in 2006 (Kalvass, 2007).  The mean age of participants in the survey was 43.5 years, 
which is comparable to the mean fisher age found by California Fish and Game of 
45.8 (Kalvass, 2007).   
 
Table 4.2 Respondent Age and Fishing Experience 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation 
Fisher Age (years) 43.5 44 67 18 13 
Seasons Fished 
(seasons) 13 10 41 0 11 
Times Fished in 
2006 (days) 4 3 30 0 4.6 
 
 
4.3.3 General RRT Results 
 
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the first section of the survey 
completed by respondents used the randomized response technique to estimate levels 
of non-compliance with regulations of the California recreational abalone fishery.  
Table 3.2 below reviews the questions that were included in the RRT section.  In all 
of the randomized response questions the targeted sensitive reply was a response of 
“yes”, except for RRT 1 where a “no” response was sensitive. The results are outlined 
in Table 4.3.   
 
Table 3.2: Randomized Response Technique Survey Questions 
RRT 1 Do you have a valid fishing license for collecting abalone? 
RRT 2 In the past year have you ever taken abalone under the minimum legal size limit? 
RRT 3 Did you take more than 24 abalone total last season? 
RRT 4 In the past year have you ever taken more than 3 abalone per day? 
RRT 5 In the past year have you ever taken more than 6 abalone per day? 
RRT 6 In the past year have you ever taken more than 9 abalone per day? 
RRT 7 In the past year have you ever taken more than 12 abalone per day? 
Innocuous Did you get heads on the coin toss? 
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Table 4.3: General Survey Results for RRT  
RRT Question and 
Associated Target 
Response 
Tally of Total 
Target Responses 
Estimated 
Proportion 
Admitting to 
Sensitive Behavior 
RRT 1 
“No” 96 
19% ± 0.006 
RRT 2 
“Yes” 102 
23% ± 0.006 
RRT 3 
“Yes” 91 
15%± 0.006 
RRT 4 
“Yes” 111 
29% ± 0.006 
RRT 5 
“Yes” 85 
11% ± 0.006 
RRT 6 
“Yes” 74 
3% ± 0.006 
RRT 7 
“Yes” 73 
2% ± 0.006 
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Figure 4.3: General RRT Survey Results 
 
Using RRT, I estimate 19% of fishers do not have a valid fishing license to 
collect abalone.  This could mean they do not hold a valid fishing license in the state 
of California, they do not have a 2007 abalone report card, or they have illegally 
purchased a second report card in one abalone season.  Thus, all of the abalone these 
fishers collect would be considered illegal take. 
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Furthermore, an estimated 23% of fishers admit to taking abalone that were 
under the seven inch minimum size limit, and 15% took more than the annual limit of 
24 abalone in the previous season.  Abalone take over the annual limit would not be 
factored into management estimations of the Total Annual Catch, and would thus be 
surplus take not being managed.   
Additionally, an estimated 29% admitted to taking more than three abalone in 
a single day in the last year.  However, the positive response rates quickly drop when 
asked if they have taken more than six, nine, or twelve red abalone in a day, as 
illustrated in Figure 4.3.  
 
4.3.4 Analysis of Variables 
 
In order to uncover trends within the responses of the population surveyed, a 
further analysis was conducted.  RRT has the potential to aid managers in identifying 
characteristics of violators when a traditional survey with socio-demographic 
questions is linked to RRT responses.  This section will present tables outlining the 
results of a backward stepwise binary logistic regression, and other statistical tests 
that make comparisons between RRT responses and socio-demographic strata, to 
establish which factors have a significant effect on the RRT responses.  
 
4.3.4.1 Locals vs. Visitors 
 
To see violation trends within the fishing population surveyed the data were 
broken down based on several demographic strata.  The first was based on county of 
residence and addressed Research Question 1.1.  The 59 surveys that identified their 
county of residence as Sonoma or Mendocino were termed “local”, and compared to 
the 120 responses from “visitors”, living outside these counties (see Table 4.4).  
Locals made up 21% of the surveys collected, which is comparable to the year 2000 
estimate from the Abalone Recovery and Management Plan that local residents make 
up 22% of the abalone fishing population (CDFG, 2005).  Due to the small number of 
surveys identified as locals, the RRT estimates for that group have much broader 
confidence intervals. 
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Table 4.4: RRT Results for “Locals” vs. “Visitors” 
 
Results for “Locals” 
 
 
Results for “Visitors” 
 
 
RRT Question 
and 
Associated 
Target 
Response 
 
 
Tally of Total 
Target 
Responses 
(n = 59) 
 
 
Estimate of 
Proportion 
Admitting to 
Sensitive Behavior 
 
 
Tally of Total 
Target 
Responses 
(n = 120) 
 
 
Estimate of 
Proportion 
Admitting to 
Sensitive Behavior 
RRT 1 
“No” 
 
20 
 
18% ± 3% 
 
76 
 
19% ± 1% 
RRT 2 
“Yes” 
 
20 
 
18% ± 3% 
 
82 
 
25% ± 1% 
RRT 3 
“Yes” 
 
15 
 
1% ± 3% 
 
76 
 
19% ± 1% 
RRT 4 
“Yes” 
 
36 
 
72% ± 3% 
 
75 
 
18% ± 1% 
RRT 5 
“Yes” 
 
20 
 
18% ± 3% 
 
65 
 
9% ± 1% 
RRT 6 
“Yes” 
 
15 
 
1% ± 3% 
 
60 
 
5% ± 1% 
RRT 7 
“Yes” 
 
15 
 
1% ± 3% 
 
58 
 
3% ± 1% 
 
 
Less than one percent of locals admitted to taking more than the annual limit 
of 24 in the 2006 season (Figure 4.4).  This is a surprising result because locals have 
easier access to the abalone simply by proximity, and so it would be understandable to 
expect them to take more animals throughout the year.  However, locals are 
significantly more likely to take more than three abalone per day (Phi = 0.225, p < 
0.001).  Seventy-two percent of locals admitted to violating the daily limit during the 
2006 season.  Unfortunately, privacy laws prohibited me from gathering information 
directly from returned punch-cards which may have helped validate these findings. 
None of the other RRT questions were significant with county of origin. 
These data show that 24% of visitors are estimated to have admitted to taking 
abalone under the legal size, with 19% admitting to fishing without a license/punch-
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card, taking more than twenty-four abalone a year in 2006, and taking more than three 
in a day respectively.   
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Figure 4.4: RRT Results for “Locals” vs. “Visitors” 
(Blue bars indicate locals, red visitors; “a” indicates difference between bars p < 0.05, “b” indicates no 
significance) 
 
 
4.3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics revealed in Tables 4.5 to 4.7 illustrate the mean and 
median ages, seasons fished, and times fishing in 2006 of respondents who answered 
“yes” versus “no” to the RRT questions.  The raw data show a slight trend for the 
younger, less experienced, and less frequent fishers to answer survey questions with 
the sensitive target reply.  However, when a Mann-Whitney test was performed, only 
the first RRT question showed a significant difference between the ages of “yes” 
respondents and “no” respondents.  While these respondent traits did not prove to be 
universally significant in these data, it is nonetheless worth noting such trends.  
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Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics of RRT Responses and Age 
Age 
Question Response Mean Median P Value Mann-Whitney U 
Yes 44.0 42.7 RRT 1 
No 42.7 41.0 
0.428 7280 
Yes 45.3 47.0 RRT 2 
No 42.5 42.0 
0.108 7027 
Yes 43.2 44.0 RRT 3 
No 43.7 43.0 
0.672 7410 
Yes 42.7 42.0 RRT 4 
No 44.1 45.0 
0.396 7855 
Yes 42.0 40.0 RRT 5 
No 44.3 46.0 
0.187 6667.5 
Yes 44.6 44.0 RRT 6 
No 43.1 44.0 
0.387 6457 
Yes 43.3 42.0 RRT 7 
No 43.7 44.5 
0.867 6602 
 
Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics of RRT Responses and Seasons Fished 
Seasons Fished 
Question Response Mean Median P Value Mann-Whitney U 
Yes 14.5 12.5 RRT 1 
No 10.4 8.0 
*** 
0.012 7175 
Yes 13.7 10.0 RRT 2 
No 12.8 10.0 
0.568 8657 
Yes 13.5 10.0 RRT 3 
No 13.0 10.0 
0.988 8544.5 
Yes 12.5 9.0 RRT 4 
No 13.5 10.0 
0.287 8623 
Yes 12.0 9.5 RRT 5 
No 13.6 11.0 
0.541 7866.5 
Yes 13.8 14.0 RRT 6 
No 12.8 10.0 
0.251 6904 
Yes 12.4 10.0 RRT 7 
No 13.4 11.0 
0.507 7126 
 
Age was most significant for RRT 2 and RRT 5, but none of the questions was 
95% significant with age (see Table 4.5).  As illustrated in Table 4.6, a Mann-
Whitney test revealed a significant difference in the number of seasons fished by a 
respondent who answered “yes” to one who answered “no” when asked if they had a 
valid fishing license (RRT 1).  This indicates that less experienced fishers are more 
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likely to answer with the target response of “no”, implying more of them violate.  
There was no statistically significant difference in the number of times fishing the 
previous season between the two response groups. 
 
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics of RRT Responses and Times Fishing in 2006 
Times Fished in 2006 
Question Response Mean Median P Value Mann-Whitney U 
Yes 4.0 3.0 RRT 1 
No 4.6 3.0 
0.353 8194.5 
Yes 4.0 3.0 RRT 2 
No 4.2 3.0 
0.838 8895.5 
Yes 3.4 3.0 RRT 3 
No 4.6 3.0 
0.218 7783 
Yes 3.8 2.5 RRT 4 
No 4.4 3.0 
0.320 8674 
Yes 4.4 3.5 RRT 5 
No 4.0 3.5 
0.469 7800 
Yes 5.0 3.0 RRT 6 
No 3.8 3.0 
0.207 6840 
Yes 3.3 2.0 RRT 7 
No 4.5 3.0 
0.185 6740 
 
 
4.3.4.3 Regression Analysis of Survey Variables 
  
In order to examine further if any of the demographic or experience variables 
could be linked to the likelihood of answering with the sensitive response to specific 
RRT questions, a backward stepwise likelihood ratio logistic regression was 
performed to model observed responses.  The variables included in the regression 
were: seasons fished, times fishing in 2006, age, income, and status as a local or 
visitor.  The results of the analysis are described in Table 4.15 below.  The regression 
was performed for all seven RRT questions, but the results for RRT 5-7 did not 
provide significant models or variables.  Overall, the regression models for RRT 1-4 
are significant, however the strength of fit of the models (R2 range from 0.021-0.119) 
indicates that they are unable to describe much of the variance in RRT responses.  In 
other words, none of the socio-demographic variables are consistently good predictors 
of violation, and there is no variable that was measured for this study that would allow 
for the profiling of potential violators. 
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Table 4.8: Backward Stepwise (Likelihood Ratio) Logistic Regression of RRT Variables 
RRT 
Question 
Model 
Variable 
Variable 
Sig. 
Exp(B) Nagelkerke 
R2 of 
Model 
Sig. of 
Model 
Times 
Fishing in 
2006 
0.050 1.057 RRT 1 
Fishing 
License Seasons 
Fished 0.002 0.956 
0.064 0.002 
Income 
($101,000- 
150,000+) 
- 1.0 
Income 
($0- 
50,000) 
0.042 0.452 
Income 
($51,000- 
75,000) 
0.047 0.460 
Income 
($76,000-
100,000) 
0.642 0.819 
RRT 2 
Undersized 
Take 
Age 0.039 0.977 
0.048 0.054 
RRT 3 
Violating 
the Annual 
Limit 
Times 
Fishing in 
2006 
0.067 1.065 0.021 0.046 
Income 
($101,000- 
150,000+) 
- 1.0 
Income 
($0- 
50,000) 
0.005 2.978 
Income 
($51,000- 
75,000) 
0.621 1.201 
Income 
($76,000-
100,000) 
0.106 1.951 
Age 0.092 1.019 
RRT 4 
Taking >3 
Abalone 
Per Day 
Sonoma or 
Mendocino 
County 
Resident 
0.000 0.287 
0.119 0.000 
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4.3.5 Fisher Awareness of Regulations 
 
Several questions were asked in the survey about respondent’s awareness of 
red abalone take regulations to address Objective 2.  These data were collected in 
order to establish whether a significant information gap may be contributing to 
violation rates.  However, Figure 4.5 and Table 4.9 illustrate that the vast majority of 
fishers not only know that there are limits, but with the exception of the annual take 
limit, most fishers can state the regulations from memory.  Many fishers who did not 
know the annual limit stated after the survey that they did not know it because they 
never fished enough to reach it.  Nonetheless, only 44.8% of respondents answered 
the question about the annual limit completely and correctly, while 93.5% correctly 
answered the daily limit question.  
One limitation with the method used here should be identified.  The survey 
questions may have been leading questions, because the RRT portion of the survey 
needed to be completed first, but it was composed of questions that contained 
numbers relating to take limits.  Several of the RRT questions asked fishers if they 
had taken more than “x” number of abalone in “y” timeframe.  Though respondents 
were not told that the numbers and timeframes in the RRT questions reflected 
regulation levels, it may have been implied.  Thus, the estimates of fisher awareness 
of regulations are over-estimates, a result which will be further addressed in the 
discussion chapter. 
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Figure 4.5: Fisher Awareness of Regulations 
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Table 4.9: Proportional Responses to Regulation Awareness Questions 
 
Question: Are there 
minimum size limits 
for abalone? 
Question: Are there daily 
Fishing quantity limits 
for abalone? 
Question: Are there 
annual Fishing quantity 
limits for abalone? 
Answered “Yes” 92% 96% 74% 
• Percent Who 
Answered Yes and 
Wrote Correct 
Limits 
79% 93.5% 
44.8% 
 
• Percent Who 
Answered Yes but 
Wrote Incorrect 
Limits 
10% 1.8% 15% 
 Gave Answer 
Above Limit 7% 0.8% 11% 
 Gave Answer 
Below Limit 3% 1% 4% 
• Percent Who 
Answered Yes but 
Left Space Blank 
2.5% 0% 24% 
Answered “No” 0% 0% 0% 
Answered “Don’t Know” 2.8% 0.7% 13.7% 
No Answer 5.7% 4% 2.5% 
 
 
Overall, respondents had a very high level of regulation awareness (Figure 
4.5).  However, the question asking fishers about the annual take limit received many 
incorrect answers of 30 abalone/per year (Table 4.10), indicating that some fishers are 
still not aware the limit has been reduced. 
 
Table 4.10 Common Incorrect Responses To Limit Questions 
 
Most Common 
Answer Below 
Limit 
Actual Limit 
Most Common 
Answer Above 
Limit 
Size Limits 6 inches 7 inches 7.25 inches 
Daily Limits 1 abalone/day 3 abalone/day 12 abalone/day 
Annual Limits 18 abalone/year 24 abalone/year 30 abalone/year 
 
A Mann-Whitney U test found no significant difference in the mean awareness 
level of fishers who replied “yes” versus “no” to the RRT questions.  Furthermore, a 
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cross-tabulation of the data revealed no significant relationship between answering 
incorrectly to the regulation awareness questions and the likelihood of answering with 
the sensitive response to the RRT questions.   
The survey also included questions regarding the sources of abalone regulation 
information used by the fishers surveyed.  This information is summarized in Table 
4.11, and indicates that the two most common sources of information about abalone 
take regulations are California Department of Fish and Game pamphlets, and word of 
mouth among fishers.  Option “a)” in Table 4.11, “NOAA”, was provided as a false 
source, as they do not have involvement in setting regulations or distributing 
information about recreational abalone take.  A false source was provided in order to 
see if people might select this option, which in effect would reveal that they did not 
have the correct information, and may just be guessing.   
 
Table 4.11: Source of Limit Information 
a) NOAA 0.7% 
b) CADFG website 16.5% 
c) CADFG pamphlet 33.3% 
d) CA fisheries officer 11% 
e) A friend 26.5% 
f) Other 12% 
 
There were no respondents who circled more than one letter, but two people 
circled “f” and then stated they gained information from all the sources except 
NOAA.  Seven of the respondents who selected “f” stated they gained their 
information from the “Fish and Game Book”, which is distinct from pamphlets in that 
is provides rules on many fishing activities and practices outside of abalone 
collection.  Of the responses marked as “f) other” the most common source was the 
abalone report card itself, which suggests this could be provided as a survey choice in 
the future.
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Chapter 5 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
In this chapter the findings of the study will be discussed in the context of the 
project objectives and research questions.  The appropriateness of specific 
methodologies to address the research question will be discussed, and potential 
sources of bias identified.  In addition, the aim of the project will be discussed and the 
general policy and management implications of the study will be presented along with 
supporting quotes from abalone experts in the Northern California fishery.  The 
chapter will conclude with a discussion of the implications of the results for the red 
abalone fishery, other fisheries, and future research. 
 
5.2 Estimating Illegal Behavior to Prioritize Violations 
 
The first research objective of this thesis was to utilize the randomized 
response technique (RRT) to estimate proportions of non-compliance for recreational 
red abalone (Haliotis rufescens) fishers in Northern California, and analyze variables 
which could influence those proportions.  Non-compliance estimates allow for more 
effective evaluation of the actual success or failure of management measures, and 
provide insights into how the behavior of fishers may be impacting the resource 
(Sumaila et al., 2006).  Furthermore, estimates of violation rates for specific 
regulations can be developed to help managers set priorities and manage enforcement 
effort, to target the regulation types they see as essential to sustainability (Hughey et 
al., 2003).  Previous non-compliance estimates for the Northern California red 
abalone fishery have not provided managers with reliable information about non-
compliance rates for specific regulations, or data regarding which socio-demographic 
variables may affect violation behavior (Rogers-Bennett, Sen. Biologist Specialist 
CDFG, pers. comm., December 21, 2007). 
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The results for the total sample have narrow confidence intervals and low 
variance, indicating that they are quite reliable estimates for the overall population 
(Figure 4.3).  Cultural bias may have been introduced by the exclusion of 8% of 
approached fishers due to language barriers.  The Asian population was under-
represented in the data, and therefore, there is no way to predict the impact those 
responses would have had on the estimates.  However, given those fishers only 
composed 8% of the fishers approached for this study, it is unlikely their responses 
would have had a large impact on the results.  Additionally, it must be noted that the 
general RRT results are still likely to be under-estimates of actual illegal take, because 
it is assumed that despite using the randomized response technique to reduce response 
bias, there will still be participants who give evasive responses regardless of the 
survey instrument (Chaloupka, 1985).   
The general results of the RRT survey can be used to rank violation types and 
illustrate compliance problems.  I estimate that 29% of the fishers surveyed had 
violated the daily limit of three abalone in the last season, while only 11% had taken 
more than 6 abalone in a day, 3% had taken more than 9 abalone and 2% took over 12 
abalone in a single fishing day.  Minimum size limit violations were estimated to be 
the second most common, at 23% non-compliance, followed an estimate of 19% non-
compliance with the fishing licensing laws.  Finally, non-compliance with the annual 
take limit of 24 abalone per year is ranked the fourth most common violation, at an 
estimated 15%.  With the ranked results of RRT, and their knowledge of the social 
and ecological characteristics of the fishery, managers can prioritize certain violations 
to reduce non-compliance.   
Based on survey estimates and expert opinion, reducing non-compliance with 
the daily take limit should become the top priority of red abalone managers in 
Northern California.  Though there are no data available to compare with the RRT 
estimates, the personal experience of Warden Combes (pers. Comm., August, 2007) 
supports the finding that daily take limits are the most common violation in this 
fishery (see Table 4.1).  Furthermore, the experts interviewed for this study rated daily 
take limits the second highest threat to management.  Concerns about daily limit 
violations result from the important role of this measure in reducing point-source 
depletion of the stocks and maintaining densities suitable for replenishment (Table 
2.4).   
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  The second priority of managers, as revealed by the results and interviews, 
should be the reduction of annual take violations.  All three experts interviewed for 
this research felt annual limit violations posed a high threat to the sustainable 
management of red abalone in Northern California.  Despite the seemingly low non-
compliance estimate for this limit, managers are less willing to accept annual limit 
violations because the rule serves a vital role in limiting legal extraction to within the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) set by managers (CDFG, 2005).  The TAC is designed 
to maintain the stocks over the long term, and managers expressed concern that any 
take above the annual limit of 24 abalone per fisher would not be included in the legal 
catch estimates for the fishery, and would result in under-estimates of the Total Catch 
(TC).  Dr. Laura Rogers-Bennett explained, “If managers continually underestimate 
take, the protective mechanisms outlined in the Abalone Recovery and Management 
Plan which are designed to reduce the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) or even close the 
recreational fishery if needed, may not come into effect in time to prevent long-lasting 
reductions in abalone densities.”   
Unfortunately, annual limit violations can be very difficult to detect with 
conventional methods, particularly when they coincide with intentional falsification of 
the abalone report card (G. Combes, CA Fish and Game Warden, pers. comm., 
November 15, 2007).  These data show that RRT can help managers overcome the 
challenge of estimating annual take limit violations, by allowing them to develop 
violation estimates regardless of the evasive actions of violators.  
As with annual limit violations, abalone removed by unlicensed fishers are 
also not accounted for in management catch estimates.  This violation type should 
therefore be pursued in conjunction with annual take limit violations, as they both 
have the same effect on the accuracy of catch estimations.  As the Abalone Recovery 
and Management Plan outlines, managers use estimates of the number of abalone 
permit report cards purchased annually and effort statistics from the returned report 
cards and phone surveys to estimate the annual total legal catch of red abalone 
(CDFG, 2005).  Thus, all take by the 19% percent of fishers who do not have valid 
licenses will be excluded from these statistics. 
Finally, the implications of the minimum size limit violation estimate for 
management priorities are not clear.  The experts interviewed disagreed about the 
threat posed by this violation, because it impacts stocks differently in the long and 
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short term.   Managers should discuss the proportion of non-compliance they consider 
acceptable for this violation. 
5.3 Profiling Illegal Behavior to Aid Priority Setting 
 
The literature suggests managers need to expand on the non-compliance 
estimates for the general population, by examining variables within the fishing 
community that may be impacting violation rates (Hønneland, 1999; Sumaila et al., 
2006).  For instance, ignorance of regulations and some socio-demographic variables 
may affect an individual’s attitude towards risk and crime (Furlong, 1991).  
Management agencies often struggle with limited staff and financial resources for 
monitoring natural resources, and therefore must find ways to prioritize management 
action (Davies, 1996; Mittermeier et al., 1998).  Information about the regulatory 
awareness and socio-demographic profile of a typical violator can aid managers with 
priority setting by illustrating which sectors are the least compliant, and allowing 
them to focus resources on encouraging compliance within that group (Hønneland, 
1999; Sumaila et al., 2006). 
 
5.3.1 Fisher Awareness of Red Abalone Laws  
 
The RRT estimates from the general survey were first analyzed to establish 
whether violation rates may be linked to low fisher awareness of specific regulations, 
but the comparison revealed generally very high levels of knowledge regarding 
abalone fishing regulations (Figure 4.6).  The question regarding the limits on annual 
take resulted in the highest proportion of incorrect and incomplete responses, because 
while 74% were aware limits existed, only 45% of respondents answered completely 
and correctly.  The question on minimum size limits had the second lowest proportion 
of correct answers with 79% answering completely and correctly out of the 92% that 
indicated there were limits, followed by the daily take limit question which had 93.5% 
out of 96%. 
The generally high level of awareness of abalone regulations among the 
fishers surveyed indicates that abalone control measures are being successfully 
conveyed by managers to that group.  However, the results of this part of the survey, 
as with the RRT results, could be subject to cultural or language bias.  The majority of 
 71 
fishers accessed regulation information for abalone collection from written California 
Fish and Game sources (e.g. pamphlets, websites, report card, books), and these 
pamphlets are printed exclusively in English, despite the fact that many abalone 
fishers may not speak or read English.  Therefore, the 8% of fishers approached who 
did not complete the survey due to language barriers may have had reduced regulation 
awareness as compared to the English speaking fishers, due to their dependence on 
non-written sources. 
Response-order-bias may have also influenced this part of the survey (Israel 
and Taylor, 1990).  As mentioned in the methodology chapter, the RRT section was 
always administered before the regulation awareness section.  The RRT method may 
have encouraged respondents to mark “yes” who otherwise would not have, by 
suggesting through the line of questioning that the numbers used in the sensitive RRT 
questions were based on regulations   For example, the question “Did you take more 
than 24 abalone total last season?” may have suggested to fishers that 24 is the annual 
limit.  While the word “regulation” was not used in the RRT questions, and there was 
only a fifty percent probability of drawing the sensitive question and seeing the 
numbers used, it is still possible the trends in the line of questioning may have 
influenced some respondents.  Response-order-bias may therefore account for some 
of the fishers who indicated there was a limit but that left the space for writing the 
limit levels empty, or answered with incorrect limits.  It is possible this bias also may 
have contributed to some of the fishers who answered the limit correctly and 
completely if they assumed the numbers included in the RRT section were the limits 
and wrote them on the survey.   
 I found no significant relationship between regulation awareness and RRT 
responses, indicating that those fishers who knew the abalone regulations were just as 
likely to admit to illegal behavior as those who did not know the regulations.  In other 
words, the estimated proportions of violations from these two groups were roughly 
equal.  This is an important finding in terms of management priority setting, because 
it implies that ignorance of red abalone regulations is not a major cause of illegal 
behavior in the area surveyed, and suggests that managers are succeeding in 
communicating the regulations to fishers.  Therefore, managers do not need to expend 
more effort attempting to increase the regulatory awareness of fishers, but can instead 
focus resources on increasing compliance among fishers who knowingly violate. 
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5.3.2 Socio-Demographic Variables as Predictors of Non-Compliance  
 
Socio-demographic variables have been found in other studies to influence 
fisher decisions relating to compliance (Furlong, 1991; Hatcher et al., 2000; Sumaila 
et al., 2006).  Furlong (1991) found that older fishers were generally more compliant 
than younger fishers, as younger fishers were more prepared to risk getting caught.  
Furthermore, fishers with more experience often have different violation rates to 
novice fishers, and the present economic status of fishers, combined with the possible 
gain from poaching, are key determinants of illegal behavior (Hatcher et al., 2000; 
Sumaila et al., 2006).  Several case studies have shown that low income individuals 
are more likely to engage in illegal fishing behavior, because the marginal benefit 
they would gain from violation is higher than that of someone with a high income 
(Furlong, 1991; Faasen and Watts, 2007).   
This study could not fully explore the effects of gender on compliance due to 
the small number of female respondents, and ethnicity was excluded from the analysis 
due to cultural and language barriers which would have biased the conclusions.  
However, the socio-demographic variables that were analyzed with the survey (age, 
income, local vs. visitor, seasons fished, and times fishing in 2006) could not form an 
accurate demographic profile of non-compliant fishers with either the regression or 
direct comparisons (see Tables 4.5-4.8).  It can therefore be concluded that none of 
these socio-demographic variables are good indicators of non-compliance in this 
fishery.  
It was expected that primarily demographic variables would not be adequate to 
fully model all seven of the RRT questions.  The compliance literature suggests socio-
demographic status may affect the decision to violate, but these variables are unlikely 
to affect the degree of violation after the decision to act illegally has been made 
(Furlong, 1991; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999).  Therefore, RRT questions 5-7 were 
most likely influenced by other drivers, such as the level of enforcement and possible 
social and financial costs and benefits, and did not result in significant models or 
variables within the regression (Hatcher et al., 2000; Sumaila et al., 2006).  Future 
studies could focus an RRT survey on these alternate variables to improve the 
predictive power of the regression models, but it appears that readily observable 
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demographic traits can not be correlated to an increase in illegal behavior at this time.  
These results imply that management must spread enforcement effort evenly across 
these socio-demographic sectors. 
 
5.3.3 Locals vs. Visitor Illegal Behavior 
 
The decision to violate environmental regulations is affected by moral and 
social considerations, a fisher’s knowledge of the severity and intensity of 
enforcement, and the financial incentives and penalties associated with violation 
(Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Hatcher et al., 2000; Sumaila et al., 2006).  In order to 
illustrate any patterns in RRT responses, the surveys of fishers who live at close 
proximity to the resource were examined against those residing at greater distances.  
Compliance theory suggests management may be able to use this information when 
setting enforcement priorities by focusing more resources on the group having the 
greatest negative impact on the abalone (Hønneland, 1999; Hughey, Cullen and 
Moran, 2003).   
The results showed that visitors had higher estimated proportions of illegal 
behavior for most RRT questions, which may partially reflect the higher fishing costs 
they experience related to transportation and accommodation (Sumaila et al., 2006).  
The only exception occurred when locals were asked if they had violated the daily 
take limit.  I estimate that 72% of locals took more than three abalone in a day the 
previous season, and 18% took more than six abalone in a day.  The estimation for 
local violation of daily limits was significantly higher than for non-locals, 18% of 
whom I estimate took more than three, and 9% over six in a day.  This contrasts most 
notably with the results of the question on annual take violations of locals and 
visitors, for which an estimated 19% of visitors had violated the maximum take limit, 
but less than 1% of locals had. 
Overall, though local fishers may violate the daily limit to a greater extent than 
visiting fishers, they are proportionally more compliant with the other regulations than 
visitors.  The literature suggests this trend could reflect different normative and 
economic drivers operating between locals and visitors (Sumaila et al., 2006).  The 
non-compliance drivers of local fishers may be affected by the work of abalone 
conservation groups and the general population who actively report illegal activities 
to the California Turn in Poachers (CalTIP) program, and frequently run stories in 
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local papers about the court proceedings of poaching cases and details of large 
abalone seizures (SCAN, 2008).  Thus, locals may have a heightened perception of 
government and community-based enforcement, and greater knowledge of the 
penalties than visiting fishers.  These findings have interesting implications for 
managers when options are discussed in terms of the compliance literature.   
 
5.4 Policy and Management Implications  
  
Sumaila et al. (2006) suggest that the cost of fishing affects the perceived 
benefit of illegal take, because fishers weigh the costs of fishing gear, accommodation 
and transportation against the benefit of catch.  They therefore assert that fishers with 
higher fishing-related costs are more likely to want to take more catch as 
compensation for their expenses (Sumaila et al., 2006).  Warden Combes of the 
California Department of Fish and Game confirmed that perceptions of fishing costs 
can affect illegal take in the red abalone fishery when he described the mindset of 
visiting fishers: “They’ve taken the time to come up here, spent the money, and 
they’re not going home without their full limit of abalone.  That mindset is part of the 
reason we catch fishers filling their buddy’s bag limit in addition to their own”.  These 
fishing-related costs may partially explain why visitors have higher estimated 
violation rates in most categories. 
However, the literature suggests compliance is also affected by the possible 
financial gains or losses associated with illegal action, as well as social norms, peer 
pressure, and personal beliefs (see Figure 2.3).  As the take limits and penalty levels 
are the same for local and visiting fishers, and fishing-related costs vary from person 
to person, it is likely that normative differences may also contribute to the observed 
patterns of violation.  The results of both the daily and annual limit questions could 
reflect varying amounts of peer pressure amongst local and visiting fishers, and 
different social norms regarding abalone limit compliance.   
 
5.4.1 Annual Limit Violations 
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The compliance literature and normative theory would suggest that local 
people may have a heightened awareness of abalone conservation issues in general, 
simply due to proximity to the resource and community involvement (Sen and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Fishing Compliance Drivers and Example Measures  
(Adapted from: Sumaila et al., 2006) 
 
Nielsen, 1996).  This may play a role in Northern California as there are several 
conservation groups in Sonoma and Mendocino counties, operating at both 
community and regional levels, which support abalone compliance and education 
projects (S.C.A.N., 2008, www.abalonenetwork.org ). 
While this study did not ask respondents why they complied with regulations, 
future studies could use RRT to investigate whether these conservation groups may 
have successfully communicated the threat posed by annual take violations to local 
communities, using social capital to increase the local perception of regulatory 
legitimacy and enforcement (Heckathorn, 1990; Hønneland, 1999; Bowles and Gintis, 
2002).  Furthermore, the compliance literature suggests that households that are 
financially dependent on a resource are generally more compliant (Furlong, 1991).  
Local residents may see it as against their collective best interest to violate the annual 
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limit, because the coastal economy is very dependent on red abalone to draw tourists 
(Stone, 2002; LMID, 2007).   
The estimates of local vs. visitor compliance, the general RRT estimate, and 
the high level of concern about annual limit violations expressed by the experts 
interviewed suggests that management may want to focus more effort on improving 
compliance with this regulation.  The estimate that only 1% of local fishers had 
violated the annual limit implies that managers should prioritize efforts to reduce non-
compliance among visiting fishers, which may involve shifting resources to increase 
the enforcement and education programs targeted at this group.  As the compliance 
literature suggests, increasing the level of enforcement effort at popular fishing sites 
and letting more visitors know about the watchdog function of CalTIP and abalone 
conservation groups such as SCAN, could help reduce violation levels among visitors 
by increasing the perceived level of enforcement and affecting Drivers 2-4 (Sumaila 
et al., 2006).  Due to their disperse community origins, the literature suggest 
economic-based tools may be more effective than normative measures in influencing 
visitor behavior, but wider media coverage of abalone-related stories could affect 
visitor consciousness of abalone conservation issues and the risks of violation (Bator 
and Cialdini, 2000).   
 
5.4.2 Daily Limit Violations 
 
The first priority of management as revealed by the general RRT estimates, 
should be improving compliance with the daily take limit.  As previously discussed, 
daily take limit violation rates of 29% among the general population, and 18% and 
72% among visitors and locals respectively are of serious concern to management  
because they represent the highest estimates of non-compliance found in the study 
(see Figure 4.4).  Furthermore, these estimates imply the effect of community 
pressure to comply with regulations, which may be reducing annual limit violation 
rates in the local community, is incomplete.  These findings illustrate the need for 
managers to focus greater attention on daily take limit compliance.  With so many 
fishers (especially locals) exceeding the daily take limit, red abalone populations 
could suffer from point-source depletion, and adult densities could be reduced enough 
 77 
to result in poor abalone recruitment in those areas for years to come (Karpov et al., 
2000).   
However, during informal conversations with respondents who had just 
completed the survey, over a dozen local fishers independently expressed the view 
that local residents should be able to take more than three abalone in a day as long as 
they complied with the annual limit and still reported their take to managers.  These 
comments seem to illustrate that local fishers do not consider the daily limit to be 
legitimate in the context of their community, reducing their inclination to comply 
(McCay, 1980; Hønneland, 1999).   
Among other reasons, this perspective may stem from a lack of understanding 
of the point-source depletion issues that the daily limit manages (CDFG, 2005).  
Programs which raise awareness of the threats posed by point-source depletion could 
help to increase compliance by boosting fishers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of daily 
limit regulations (Hønneland, 1999).  Though daily limit violation is not only a local 
problem, these programs could be readily implemented along the coast with the help 
of the community groups already operating, and could reduce the extreme levels of 
daily limit non-compliance among local fishers.  In addition, informing both local and 
visiting fishers of the high fine levels for daily limit violations, and continuing to 
patrol fishing areas may reduce the number of fishers who choose to violate by 
increasing their perceptions of the costs of violation (Sumaila et al., 2006).   
 
5.4.3 Minimum Size Limit Violations 
 
Similar techniques could be used to combat violations of the minimum size 
limit.  While the results showed that 23% of the fishers had taken undersized abalone 
(see Table 4.2), making it the second most common violation type, minimum size 
limit violations may not be as urgent a problem for management as the other violation 
types.  Both Peter Kalvass, a Senior Marine Biologist, and Dr. Laura Rogers-Bennett, 
a Senior Biologist Specialist, rated the taking of sub-legal sized abalone as a moderate 
threat to red abalone management, but their explanations for their ratings differed.  
Peter Kalvass noted that in the last decade fishery-independent dive surveys have 
found fewer sub-legal abalones than in previous estimates.  He is concerned that if 
poor recruitment continues, the sustainability of the species could be threatened as 
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there may not be enough juvenile red abalone to replace the large adults being 
removed by fishers and natural mortality.  However, from the perspective of Dr. 
Laura Rogers-Bennett, undersized take is not of high importance because small 
abalone are not as prolifically reproductive as larger individuals.  Red abalone are 
slow growing, but the egg production of females increases exponentially with body 
length until they reach a peak reproductive size of 215 mm (8.5 inches)  (Rogers-
Bennett et al., 2004).  Therefore, immature abalone, or those that have become 
reproductive but are sub-legal in size, are not as important to replenishing the 
population; and, Dr. Rogers-Bennett suggests, losing large females, rather than small 
ones, is the most pressing threat to sustainable abalone management. 
As with the other violation types, improved compliance with this measure may 
result from the introduction of programs to educate fishers about the link between size 
and reproduction in red abalones.  This information may improve fisher perceptions 
of regulatory legitimacy by helping fishers better understand how their actions affect 
the future of the resource (Hønneland, 1999).  Continued enforcement of the size limit 
is also important to help control the take of sub-legal red abalone and ensure that 
these animals reach legal size in the future, but expert opinion seems to suggest the 
other violations are of more immediate concern to managers. 
Over the long term, managers should also consider other regulatory tools 
which have been designed and implemented in fisheries to address concerns about 
maintaining a stock of large reproductive individuals over the long-term (Reef Fish 
Stock Assessment Panel, 1992).  The introduction of an upper size limit as well as a 
minimum size limit (slot-size limits) secures the reproductive capacity of the abalone 
population by maintaining the stock of large females (see Table 2.4) (Reef Fish Stock 
Assessment Panel, 1992).  Unfortunately, as Dr. Rogers-Bennett explained, such 
regulations would be difficult to implement in a trophy fishery such as the 
recreational red abalone fishery, because fishers enjoy competing for the biggest 
animals.  For that reason, regulations which would limit the maximum size of take 
from this fishery would be difficult to implement, and would most likely encounter 
stiff resistance from resource users.  Nonetheless, a slot-size limit may be an option 
worth serious consideration if there continues to be high levels of legal and illegal 
take and reduced recruitment. 
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5.5 Recommendations for Management  
 
This thesis has resulted in several key recommendations for managers in the 
Northern California red abalone fishery, and fisheries worldwide.   
 
5.5.1 Red Abalone Management in Northern California  
 
Managers should continue to focus enforcement effort on the priority areas 
revealed by the RRT estimates.  Reducing the proportion of daily take violations by 
locals should be a top priority, as should the overall reduction of annual take limit and 
licensing violations.  However, enforcement effort should be evenly spread across all 
socio-demographic sectors of the fisher community, and not focused on one group.  
Management may benefit from partnerships with local abalone/marine conservation 
groups that can take advantage of social capital to increase awareness of point-source 
depletion and violation penalties.  Several conservation organizations presently lend 
time to help with management efforts, so these relationships could be readily utilized 
without much delay (SCAN, 2008, www.abalonenetwork.org ).  Furthermore, 
dialogue about the acceptable level of minimum size limit violations should be 
undertaken, and alternate strategies for maintaining a breeding stock (such as slot-take 
limits) should be explored.   
The results of this study strongly suggest red abalone managers in Northern 
California should continue to use the randomized response technique to estimate non-
compliance in their fishery.  This method has resulted in estimates of proportional 
violation rates for four regulation types, allowing management priorities to emerge 
based on estimates and expert opinion.  Managers did not previously have access to 
reliable non-compliance estimates for individual violation types, which would have 
allowed them to prioritize in this way, and this study provides baseline data with 
which future estimates can be compared.  Such comparisons could provide managers 
with a reliable way to assess the impact of new measures on compliance, and could 
therefore aid in monitoring compliance levels for adaptive management. 
The use of RRT should also be expanded to allow for the quantification of 
illegal recreational take.  Quantitative RRT methods have already been developed, 
and could be readily adapted to analyze the red abalone fishery (Fox and Tracy, 
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1986). At present management is estimating Total Catch (TC) by combining legal 
take figures from abalone permit report cards and phone interviews, with very rough 
illegal take estimates from roadblocks and citation figures.  Using RRT would take 
the guess-work out of estimating illegal take, and would result in a more precise TC 
estimate.   This estimate could be used when assessing the TAC and setting 
management priorities.   
Furthermore, quantitative RRT methods could also be used to estimate illegal 
take for different regulation types, including other violation categories not included in 
this study (e.g. high-grading, failure to reattach abalone, documentation violations) in 
order for management to see all aspects of non-compliance and estimate the impact of 
unreported fishing-related mortality (CDFG, 2005).  Research could be conducted 
which would tie violation proportions to specific locations in order to determine the 
sites with the greatest level of daily limit violations.  These data would allow 
enforcement officers to target non-compliance more efficiently, and would give 
managers additional information about which areas could be suffering from point 
source depletion.   
RRT methods should also be developed to investigate the non-compliance 
drivers operating within the red abalone fishery, to help management set priorities and 
targets for enforcement (Sumaila et al., 2006).  The extent to which compliance is 
affected by normative influences such as social norms and peer pressure could be 
investigated to clarify some differences between local and visiting fishers 
(Hønneland, 1999).  Barriers to compliance that undermine managerial authority and 
reduce conservation success, such as negative peer pressure, language barriers, 
biological factors, or certain traditional practices and social norms, could be identified 
with RRT (Hønneland, 1999).   
While managers may consider some of these factors difficult to manipulate, 
the literature suggests an understanding of the compliance barriers operating in a 
fishery is essential (Hønneland, 1999).  With this information managers could begin 
investigating ways to increase perceptions of managerial legitimacy, which normative 
theory suggests could greatly affect compliance (Hønneland, 1999; Sumaila et al., 
2006) Enforcement efforts and programs could be designed to counteract negative 
social influences.  For instance, persuasion theory could be used to develop signs or 
public service announcements which would mobilize action against violation, and 
could be specifically targeted at local or visitor demographics (Bator and Ciladini, 
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2000; Cialdini, 2003).  These messages could both educate the public about abalone 
issues, and emphasize the development of positive social norms and mutual 
enforcement.    
5.5.2 Implications for Other Fisheries 
 
Studies utilizing the randomized response technique could be applicable to 
many fisheries world-wide.  RRT is a versatile method which could easily be adapted 
to aid managers in estimating fisher non-compliance for many species.  Other studies 
have successfully used RRT to investigate compliance with shell collection permits 
and freshwater fishing gear restrictions (Chaloupka, 1985; Schill and Kline, 1995).  In 
this study, RRT has shown itself to be an effective tool for highlighting compliance 
concerns, analyzing associated variables, and helping managers set priorities.   
Fisheries with a large number of users are best suited for this method, because 
large sample sizes reduce variance and result in more robust estimates (Fox and 
Tracy, 1986).  Therefore, areas where resource users are aggregated and easily 
contacted are best for allowing researchers to encounter enough respondents 
(Chaloupka, 1985).  It is also important that research is not conducted by individuals 
who are in a position of power over respondents (e.g. wardens employed by the 
management body), because fishers may have feelings of resentment or fear towards 
these individuals which could bias results or lower response rates (Fox and Tracy, 
1986).  Finally, it would be advantageous to have translators available if required, and 
to employ surveyors of similar social and cultural backgrounds to respondents in 
order to reduce possible cultural biases. 
  
5.6 Chapter Summary/Conclusions 
 
This research has shed light on several of the issues surrounding illegal take in 
the red abalone (Haliotis rufescens) fishery of Northern California.  The randomized 
response technique proved to be an effective tool for estimating recreational fisher 
non-compliance with four major management measures.  The daily take limit had the 
highest estimated non-compliance (29%) followed by the minimum size limit (23%), 
licensing laws (19%), and the annual take limit (15%).  These estimates were 
discussed in light of the priorities of three red abalone experts, who were asked which 
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violation types pose the greatest threat to sustainable red abalone management.  Based 
on the estimates and expert opinion, the first priority of management should be 
reducing non-compliance with the daily take limit, in order to reduce the threat of 
point-source depletion.  The next priority should be reducing annual limit violations, 
as these violation have direct repercussions on the ability of managers to accurately 
estimate catch and set sustainable limits.  The prioritization of minimum size limit 
non-compliance is not clear, as these violations have different effects in the long and 
short term, and should be discussed by management. 
Variables regarding regulatory awareness and socio-demographic status were 
also analyzed, as the literature suggests they may influence fisher decision-making 
regarding violation, and further aid with priority setting.  The results indicated high 
levels of regulation awareness among fishers, and no significant relationship between 
awareness and violation; indicating management is effectively communicating 
regulations to fishers.  Additionally, the socio-demographic variables analyzed with 
the survey (age, income, local vs. visitor, seasons fished, and times fishing in 2006), 
could not form an accurate demographic profile of a typical violator with either a 
backward stepwise logistic regression, or direct comparisons.  This finding indicates 
enforcement effort should be equally distributed among all socio-demographic 
sectors.   
On the other hand, an analysis of local versus visitor compliance resulted in an 
estimate of 72% local non-compliance with the daily take limit, but only 1% with the 
annual take limit.  This contrasts with estimates among visiting fishers of 18% daily 
limit violation, and 19% non-compliance with the annual limit.  These results 
emphasize the importance of prioritizing daily limit compliance, particularly among 
locals, and also suggest the drivers of non-compliance may differ between these 
groups.  The literature suggests both normative and economic factors may play a role 
in influencing these groups, with local fishers having different perceptions of the costs 
and benefits of violation due to proximity to the resource, different social norms, 
heightened awareness of management effort, and lower-fishing related costs.   
 This study resulted in several implications for management.  Firstly, the study 
illustrated how RRT can be used to estimate non-compliance, and how those 
estimates can be combined with management knowledge to set priorities among 
violation types and user groups.  Therefore, it is recommended that red abalone 
managers continue to use RRT to estimate non-compliance in this fishery.  Future 
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studies may use the estimates from this study as baseline figures for comparisons, and 
also add additional violation types to the survey.  Furthermore, quantitative RRT 
techniques should be used to estimate the illegal catch, as these numbers could be 
incorporated into management estimates for the Total Catch and used for setting a 
sustainable Total Allowable Catch.  Future research could also link RRT surveys to 
specific locations, to reveal the sites with the greatest illegal take to managers.  The 
normative and economic drivers of non-compliance operating among local and 
visiting fishers could be explored to identify areas managers may be able to influence.   
 The methods used in this study could also be successfully applied to other 
fisheries and species.  Though this is the first study to apply the randomized response 
technique to a marine fishery, RRT has proven to be an excellent tool for evaluating 
the extent of non-compliance and is uniquely capable of aiding managers in 
prioritizing specific violation types.  Linking the method to a simple socio-
demographic survey has further increased the potential analysis managers may 
conduct.  As this study has shown, there is enormous potential for the randomized 
response technique to improve the sustainable management of marine resources. 
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Appendix 1: California Abalone Permit Report Card 
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Appendix 2: Fisher Survey Site Schedule 
    Friday August 10 
Saturday 
August 11 
Sunday 
August 12 
Week 
1 
     
Site 1 
Ft Ross & 
Reef 
(Sonoma) 
Site D 
Stillwater 
Cove 
(Sonoma) 
Monday 
August 13 
Tuesday 
August 14 
Wednesday 
August 15 
Thursday 
August 16 
Friday 
August 17 
Saturday 
August 18 
Sunday 
August 19 
Week 
2 Site 1 Ft Ross & 
Reef 
(Sonoma) 
Site B 
Fisk Mill-salt 
pt. 
(Sonoma) 
Site 4 
Arena Cove 
(Mendocino) 
Site 2 
Van Damme 
(Mendocino) 
Site 3 
Sea Ranch 
(Mendocino) 
Site C 
Miscellaneous 
Small 
(Mendocino) 
Site 2 
Van Damme 
(Mendocino) 
Monday 
August 20 
Tuesday 
August 21 
Wednesday 
August 22 
Thursday 
August 23 
Friday 
August 24 
Saturday 
August 25 
Sunday 
August 26 
Week 
3 Site 4 
Arena Cove 
(Mendocino) 
Site 3 
Sea Ranch 
(Mendocino) 
Site 2 
Van Damme 
(Mendocino) 
Site 1 
Ft Ross & 
Reef 
(Sonoma) 
Site C 
Miscellaneous 
Small 
(Mendocino) 
Site 3 
Sea Ranch 
(Mendocino) 
Site B 
Fisk Mill-
salt pt. 
(Sonoma) 
Monday 
August 27 
Tuesday 
August 28 
Wednesday 
August 29 
Thursday 
August 30 
Friday 
August 31 
Saturday 
September 1 
Sunday 
September 2 
Week 
4 Site 2 
Van Damme 
(Mendocino) 
Site 1 
Ft Ross & 
Reef 
(Sonoma) 
Site 3 
Sea Ranch 
(Mendocino) 
Site A 
Elk 
(Mendocino) 
Site D 
Stillwater 
Cove 
(Sonoma) 
Site A 
Elk 
(Mendocino) 
Site 4 
Arena Cove 
(Mendocino) 
Monday 
September 3 
Tuesday 
September 4 
Wednesday 
September 5 
Thursday 
September 6 
Friday 
September 7 
Saturday 
September 8 
Sunday 
September 9 
Week 
5 Site 2 
Van Damme 
(Mendocino) 
Site C 
Miscellaneous 
Small 
(Mendocino) 
Site 4 
Arena Cove 
(Mendocino) 
Site D 
Stillwater 
Cove 
(Sonoma) 
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Appendix 3: Information Sheet for Survey Respondents 
 
Information Sheet for a Recreational Abalone Fishing Study 
 
Researcher: Sara Blank, School of Geography Environment and Earth Studies, 
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.  
 
I am a Masters student in Environmental Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, 
New Zealand. As part of this degree I am undertaking a research project leading to a 
thesis. 
 
This study is designed to determine the usefulness of the Randomized Response 
Technique (RRT) when applied to illegal abalone fishing. The study attempts to 
provide an estimate of non-compliance within the recreational abalone fishery. This 
information could help improve the management of abalone to ensure sustainable 
harvests into the future.  The University requires that ethics approval be obtained for 
research projects involving human participants. 
 
If you volunteer you will be asked to participate in a series of three RRT questioning 
sessions and a short survey.  The entire process will be strictly anonymous. For the 
RRT portion you will flip a coin and look at it without revealing the result to the 
interviewer. Then you will randomly select one of two questions from a bag, without 
revealing which question you choose to the interviewer.   One card asks “Did you get 
heads on the coin toss?”, and the other asks a question about abalone fishing.  You 
simply record your response by circling “yes” or “no” on the survey form, and then 
place it with the other surveys in the collection box.  The interviewer has no way of 
knowing which question you responded to or which form is yours, so anonymity is 
assured.  Following the RRT’s you will be asked your age and ethnicity, as well as 
questions about your knowledge of regulations and how you acquired that knowledge. 
 
The whole interviewing session will take about 10 minutes. 
 
Participation is voluntary and notes on feedback will only be viewed by myself and 
my supervisor at the university.  There is no penalty for not participating or for 
withdrawing from participation at any stage and your name will never be asked for or 
recorded.  The results of the study will form the basis of my thesis, and copies will be 
given to the School of Geography Environment and Earth Sciences at Victoria, 
Victoria University Library, and possibly also published in academic journals. 
 
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the 
project, please contact Sara Grace Blank, Graduate Student, Victoria University of 
Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, NZ phone +64 021 048 7984 or US phone 
________________. You may also contact my project advisor, Dr. Mike Gavin, 
Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, NZ phone 04 463 5195. 
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Appendix 5: Semi-Structured Interview Information Sheet and 
Consent Form 
 
Information Sheet for a Recreational Abalone Fishing Study Interview 
 
Researcher: Sara Blank, School of Geography Environment and Earth Studies, 
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand  
 
I am a Masters student in Environmental Studies at Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand. As part of this degree I am undertaking a research 
project leading to a thesis. 
 
This study is designed to determine the usefulness of the Randomized Response 
Technique (RRT) when applied to illegal abalone fishing.  The study attempts to 
provide an estimate of non-compliance within the recreational abalone fishery.  This 
information could help improve the management of abalone to ensure sustainable 
harvests into the future. I would like to interview you in order to provide my thesis 
with more background discussion and expertise on the subject of abalone 
management in California. 
 
The interview session will take approximately 30 minutes.  Questions will address 
topics such as the current effectiveness of abalone management, communication 
with the public, sources of illegal fishing, possible policy improvements, and 
managerial constraints. 
 
The interview will be confidential unless you sign a consent form and agree to be 
quoted.  Quotes from the interviews will be included in my thesis, and copies of the 
thesis will be given to the School of Geography Environment and Earth Sciences at 
Victoria, Victoria University Library, and possibly also published in academic 
journals.  I will provide you with transcripts of what will be quoted and ask you to 
sign off on these before publication of the thesis. 
 
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the 
project, please contact Sara Grace Blank, Graduate Student, Victoria University of 
Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, NZ phone +64 021 048 7984 or US phone 
________________. You may also contact my project advisor, Dr. Mike Gavin, 
Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, NZ phone 04 
463 5195. 
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(Note: To be used only with semi-structured interviews) 

 

Using the Randomized Response Technique to Investigate Illegal Fishing 
and Contribute to Abalone Management in Northern California 


I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project. I have 
had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I 
understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have provided) from this 
project (before data collection and analysis is complete) without having to give reasons 
or without penalty of any sort.  
 
I understand that I will have an opportunity to check the transcripts of the interview 
before publication.  
 
I understand that the data I provide will not be used for any other purpose or released to 
others without my written consent.  
 
 I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is 
completed.  
 
 I consent to information or opinions which I have given being attributed to 
me in any reports on this research.  
 
        Initial:_______________ 
 
I agree to take part in this research  
 
 
 
Signed:_________________________________ 
 Date:_________________ 

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Appendix 6: Semi-Structured Interview Question Topics and Rating 
Question 
 
 
ABALONE THREATS: 
 
• How would you describe the status of Red Abalone? 
• What are the greatest threats to abalone in your region? 
 -What ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES pose the greatest threat? 
 
Threat Rating Question: Please rate these violations in terms of the threat they pose to 
sustainable abalone management. 
 (very high, high, medium, low, very low) 
 
High-grading 
Failure to re-attach 
Daily take limit violations 
Annual take limit violations 
Minimum size limit violations 
Failure to document take 
Failure to document location 
 
(Discuss list.) 
 
• How big a problem is ___*Insert Violation Type*___? 
• What illegal activities are (the most) acceptable? 
 -What levels are acceptable? 
 
ILLEGAL ACTIVITY ESTIMATES: 
 
• How critical is the 12% illegal take to management? 
 
LIMITS/MANAGEMENT: 
 
• What is the process for coming up with limits?   
• Do you feel they are working? Good enough? 
 
INFORMATION COLLECTION: 
 
• What type of data collection about illegal abalone take do you feel is most useful? 
• How might information collection about the stocks, fishers, or violations be 
improved? 
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